

FAIR USE FOR FREE, OR PERMITTED-BUT-PAID?

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ABSTRACT

The U.S. Supreme Court in *Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios* fended a fork in the fair use road. The Court there upset the longstanding expectation that uses would rarely, if ever, be fair when the whole of a work was copied. In the aftermath of that decision, lower courts have rendered a plethora of decisions deeming the copying of an entire work (even with no additional authorship contribution) a fair use, and therefore “free” in both senses of the word. A perceived social benefit or some market failure appears to motivate these decisions. This is because fair use is an on/off switch: either the challenged use is an infringement of copyright or it is a fair use, which section 107 declares “is not an infringement of copyright.” As a result, either the copyright owner can stop the use, or the user not only is dispensed from obtaining permission, but also owes no compensation for the use. I contend that fair use for free should be available only where a second author copies in the creation of a new work (instances which I will call productive uses). By contrast, when the entire work is copied for essentially distributive purposes, courts and legislatures should sometimes allow the use, but subject it to an obligation to compensate authors and rights holders. This is not a radical idea: the United States is in fact an outlier in the broader international landscape of copyright exceptions. Many countries have permitted-but-paid regimes for various uses, including those by libraries, educational institutions, and technologies. Indeed, the United States has some as well, particularly respecting new technological modes of dissemination. For many authors and other members of the creative communities, while their works stoke the engines of others’ enterprises, the Internet age has proffered more rags than riches. Creators should be compensated for the non-creative reuse of their works.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Fair use is an on/off switch: either the challenged use is an infringement of copyright or it is a fair use, which section 107 declares “is not an infringement of copyright.”¹ As a result, either the copyright owner can stop the use² or the user is not only dispensed from obtaining permission, but also owes no compensation for the use. The unpaid nature of fair use introduces pressures that may distort analysis, particularly of the “transformative” character of the use,³ and of potential market harm. Faced with a use, notably in the context of new technologies, that a court perceives to be socially beneficial, a court may overemphasize its “transformativeness,” and correspondingly underestimate the market consequences, in order to prevent the copyright owner from frustrating the social benefit.⁴ Distortions can appear in the other direction as well: a court sensitive to the economic consequences of the unpaid use may feel obliged to downplay the public interest fostered by the use.⁵ Statutory licenses or privately negotiated accords within a statutory framework can alleviate the tension by ensuring that uses the legislator perceives to be in the public interest proceed free of the copyright owner’s veto, but with compensation—in other words: permitted-but-paid.⁶

1. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”).

2. But see suggestions, in *Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.*, 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) and *Abend v. MCA, Inc.*, 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988), *aff’d sub nom. Stewart v. Abend*, 495 U.S. 207 (1990), that the appropriate remedy may be monetary—in effect, judicially imposed compulsory licenses; the defendants in those cases, however, produced new works of authorship—they did not merely redistribute the underlying work; my analysis addresses distributive rather than creative uses.

3. Recent fair use caselaw suggests that once the use is deemed “transformative” it becomes presumptively “fair.” *See infra* notes 66–83 and accompanying text (discussing domination of “transformative” finding in fair use analysis).

4. *E.g.*, *Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); *Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.*, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); *Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex N.V.*, No. C 12–01521 WHA, 2013 WL 1899851 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2013) (all decisions involving search engines’ storage, indexation, and reproduction of photographic images); *Authors Guild, Inc. v. Hathitrust*, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussed *infra*).

5. *Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc.*, 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (search engine’s thumbnail images substitute for market for downloading reduced-sized images to cellphones, market harm factor favors plaintiffs; fair use defense rejected despite benefit conferred by search engines), *abrogated by Amazon*, 508 F.3d 1146.

6. That some uses should be legally permitted, but should also be compensated, may be an idea whose time is coming in the United States. *See Doug Lichtman, Fair Use Middle Ground*, MEDIA INSTITUTE (Aug. 11, 2014), <http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2014/081114.php>.

That legislatures should sometimes allow the use, but subject it to an obligation to compensate authors and rights holders, is not a radical idea: the United States is in fact an outlier in the broader international landscape of copyright exceptions. The copyright laws of European Union (“EU”) member states, and Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, do not include an all-purpose fair use defense; but all these states have enacted a panoply of copyright exceptions, particularly for library, educational, and technology uses, many of which require remuneration.⁷ (The United States also has several specific copyright exceptions, for library, educational, and certain other nonprofit uses, but they do not usually require remuneration.⁸) Thus, while our fair use doctrine confronts courts with an all-or-nothing choice, other countries have charted middle courses between barring the use and permitting its unremunerated pursuit.

In contending that some uses previously ruled “fair” should not remain unpaid, this Article argues that the copyright law should distinguish new distributions from new works, and should confine (free) “fair use” to the latter.⁹ This Article proposes that many distribution uses formerly deemed “fair” be “permitted-but-paid,” and be subject to a statutory framework for license negotiations, with compulsory licensing as a backstop. Permitted-but-paid uses may be divided into two classes: subsidy (socially worthy redistributions) and market failure (transaction costs are too high to warrant a licensing solution; or a new mode of dissemination—an infant industry—is threatened by copyright-owner recalcitrance). Because the inclusion of a use within the market failure class turns largely on facts that may evolve, these uses’ classification as permitted-but-paid should be subject to a phase out; for example, a renewable sunset following a five-year review by the Copyright Office.¹⁰

Where the use confers a public benefit and the choice is all-or-nothing, a fair use outcome is virtually assured. But were permitted-but-paid an option,

7. See discussion *infra* Section III.

8. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 108 (library exceptions), 110(1)(2) (educational exceptions), 121 (people with disabilities).

9. In referring to fair uses that yield “new works,” I deliberately avoid the term “transformative,” which I believe has obscured analysis ever since courts began to attach that label to “uses” unmoored from “works.” My proposal does not necessarily entail payment for all distributive uses; as a practical matter, many of these are impliedly licensed or “tolerated.” See generally Tim Wu, *Tolerated Use*, 31 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 617 (2008) (analyzing the intersection between “tolerated use” [casual, non-commercial infringement] and traditionally “fair” uses). By the same token, some distributive uses currently ruled “fair” might be left to be licensed in the free market.

10. Thanks to Lital Helman for inspiring this solution. Sunset provisions are not unknown in U.S. Copyright law; see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 119, 601 (2012).

we would not be lured by a dichotomy falsely pitting authors against a perceived social good. The licensing mechanism would allow both broader dissemination and provide payment to authors. One might rejoin that there is no need to license if the use is fair. But in that class of cases where the use is “fair” only because it supposedly cannot reasonably be licensed, then permitted-but-paid should replace fair use for free.

This Article does not propose any change to the analysis of fair use cases involving new creativity.¹¹ Analytical difficulties may abound there as well (for example, how much copying is too much; where lies the line between a fair use parody and an infringing derivative work), but they arise in the strongest normative universe for free use.¹² The situations I intend to address often come down to assessing whether a new use should be exempted from copyright liability in order to enable a new business model or to ensure relatively inexpensive dissemination in furtherance of socially worthy goals such as nonprofit education. The normative claims underlying redistributive uses are not based on authorship but rather on “information policy,” a notion which may cover both the interests of readers in receiving works of authorship¹³ and of new distributors in purveying them.

I recognize that my categories present a variety of line-drawing challenges. First, some would dispute my initial distinction between new-authorship (true) fair use, and subsidy or market-failure “fair” use.¹⁴ That dispute probably derives from different normative visions of the value of creating new expression as opposed to receiving or reiterating extant expression. As a result, I note the disagreement, but move on. Second, the subsidy and market-failure categories may overlap as excessive transaction costs may also characterize some of the kinds of uses I have characterized as subsidies, and social benefit may buttress the appeal of the transaction-costs justification for a permitted use. Nonetheless, I believe the categories are distinct, because there may be social policy reasons to continue to subsidize a

11. Although, were I reforming what I will call “true” fair use, I would make authorship attribution a factor in assessing fair use. Cf. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended in 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986) [hereinafter Berne Convention], arts. 10 and 10bis (requiring authorship attribution for certain quotation exceptions).

12. *But cf.* Hon. J. Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, *What’s So Fair About Fair Use? The 1999 Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture*, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 513 (1998–1999) (urging that the derivative works right be replaced by compulsory licensing).

13. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, *Fair Use Markets: On Weighing Potential License Fees*, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1814 (2011); Jessica Litman, *Readers’ Copyright*, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 325 (2011).

14. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, *Fair Use as Market Failure*, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982); Rebecca Tushnet, *Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It*, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004).

use even if the transaction-costs problem could be overcome. Finally, there is another boundary issue: permitted-but-paid must be cabined so that it avoids the slippery slide into two opposite extremes. On the one hand, my proposal should not lead to turning all of copyright law into a “liability rule”; on the other, it should not promote the conclusion that any use that can be paid for should be compensated (if not controlled).

The Article proceeds as follows. It first examines the evolution of the two classes of new-distribution fair use cases. As examples of social subsidies, the Article considers the treatment of educational copying from the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act through *Cambridge University Press v. Becker* (the Georgia State online “reserves” controversy),¹⁵ and then turns to library copying and the *HathiTrust* case.¹⁶ Market-failure cases encompass a range of examples of mass use of copyright works, from private copying to mass digitization (e.g., Google Books) to search engines.

The next part of this Article looks to Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. These copyright regimes have typically provided compensation schemes for many of the non-creative uses surveyed here. The United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand have also established, or are considering instituting, “license it or lose it” systems to promote socially beneficial distributions of copyrighted works. Moreover, some European countries have addressed market-failure problems through “extended collective licensing” systems that merge features of statutory licenses and private ordering.

Finally, I consider how to implement permitted-but-paid in the United States. As an initial matter, I inquire whether, subsequent to the Supreme

15. *Cambridge University Press v. Becker*, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012), *rev'd*, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014). Author's note: as this issue was going to press, the Eleventh Circuit announced its decision reversing and remanding for fuller analysis of the fair use factors. For an analysis see Jane C. Ginsburg, *Electronic course reserves: From false clarity to true obscurity?* MEDIA INSTITUTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES: IP VIEWPOINTS (October 31, 2014), <http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2014/103114.php>.

Another type of non-creative use of entire works (not analyzed here) is evidentiary use, for example submission of copies of third-party works in court proceedings—see, e.g., *Scott v. WorldStarHipHop, Inc.*, No. 10 CIV 9538, 2011 WL 5082410 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2011); *Shell v. City of Radford, Virginia*, 351 F. Supp. 2d 510, 513 (W.D. Va. 2005)—or as evidence of prior art in patent applications—see *American Institute of Physics v. Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.*, Civ. No. 12-528, 2013 WL 1395867 (D. Minn. Apr. 8, 2013). See also Wendy J. Gordon, *Reality as Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use*, 55 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 93 (1992) (arguing that this kind of use is use of copyrighted expression as “fact” and therefore should be an uncompensated fair use).

16. *Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust*, No. 12-4547-cv, 2014 WL 2576342 (2d Cir. June 10, 2014), *aff'g* 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).

Court's decision in *eBay v. MercExchange*,¹⁷ the tightened conditions for issuing preliminary and permanent injunctions are resulting in a *de facto* permitted-but-paid regime. If the usual panoply of copyright remedies nonetheless largely remains available, can the shadow of injunctive relief stimulate private ordering? Can judges provide the impetus to private ordering by making fair use the backstop to a "license it or lose it" regime? Or is legislation needed to enable private ordering, for example, by lessening antitrust constraints? If legislation is a necessary adjunct to private ordering, who will set the backdrop royalty rates, and how will the rates be determined? I suggest that the Copyright Royalty Board might assume that task of rate setting if the parties cannot agree, but the Board should apply the method of last best offer arbitration (sometimes referred to as "baseball arbitration") to arrive at the rate.

II. THE EVOLUTION OF REDISTRIBUTION FAIR USE

U.S. copyright law has long recognized fair use as an exception favoring new creativity.¹⁸ Justice Story's 1841 decision in *Folsom v. Marsh*,¹⁹ to which many assign the doctrine's ancestor attribution,²⁰ refined the British rule of "fair abridgement"²¹ to emphasize the authorship contributions of the alleged infringer, as well as their impact on the market for the copied work. Justice Story distinguished between "real, substantial condensation of the materials,

17. *eBay v. MercExchange*, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).

18. The doctrinal roots of the fair use exception for new creativity can be traced back to the 1841 Supreme Court opinion in *Folsom v. Marsh*, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901), discussed *infra* notes 19–22 and accompanying text. "New creativity fair use" cases still outnumber "new distribution fair use" cases on today's dockets. For an illustrative but far from exhaustive list of modern "new creativity fair use" cases, see, for example, *Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.*, 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (commercial parody of Roy Orbison's song "Oh, Pretty Woman" by 2 Live Crew rap group); *Cariou v. Prince*, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (appropriation art); *Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd.*, 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006) (reduced size reproductions of seven posters in biography of the band the Grateful Dead); *Blanch v. Koons*, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006) (appropriation art); *Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp.*, 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998) (parody of Vanity Fair cover photograph).

19. *Folsom v. Marsh* 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).

20. See, e.g., *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 575. See generally R. Anthony Reese, *The Story of Folsom v. Marsh: Distinguishing Between Infringing and Legitimate Uses*, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 259 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).

21. Epitomized in decisions such as *Gyles v. Wilcox*, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch.), and *Sayre v. Moore*, (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 139 (K.B.). On the role of "fair abridgement" in promoting new creativity, see, e.g., ISABELLA ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 170–72 (2010). On fair abridgement as a precursor to fair use, see, e.g., Matthew Sag, *The Prehistory of Fair Use*, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371 (2011).

and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon” and “merely the facile use of the scissors; or extracts of the essential parts, constituting the chief value of the original work.”²² The ensuing century-and-a-half of fair use cases almost exclusively debated the nature of the second author’s additions or alterations, pitted against the first author or copyright owner’s prospects for exploiting the work.²³ The caselaw thus calibrated the basic moving parts of the traditional fair use doctrine: authorship, public benefit, economic impact. The progress of learning²⁴ advances when the law allows follow-on authors to bestow their intellectual labor and judgment in reworking selections from a prior work, without prejudicing the profits or prospects of that work.

New distribution fair uses are different. They do not directly produce new works. (I recognize that new distribution uses may enrich the end user’s knowledge and reflections in ways that ultimately inform some subsequent creative endeavor,²⁵ but the same might be said of everything, from works of authorship to cups of coffee, that becomes an input in a prospective author’s creative process.) What motivations, therefore, underlie non-authorship-based exceptions? The caselaw and legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act indicate two broad impetuses. First, the category I have, perhaps provocatively, called “subsidy,”²⁶ in which copying for non-commercial distribution purposes (generally by educational institutions or libraries) receives a free pass (subject to a variety of limitations). (I recognize that some, particularly those who reject the characterization of copyright as a

22. *Folsom*, 9 F. Cas. at 345. Although in that case Judge Story found the use of the work (George Washington’s letters) to be infringing, notably because the letters constituted over one-third of defendant’s work and “impart[ed] to it . . . its essential value,” he nonetheless praised the defendant’s objective of producing works for school libraries, and expressed the hope that the parties might come to an “amicable settlement.” *Id.* at 349. *Folsom v. Marsh* might thus be seen as a precursor to the social-subsidy variant of permitted-but-paid; thanks for this point to Eva Subotnick.

23. See, e.g., cases cited, *supra* note 18; see also *Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Loew’s, Inc.*, 356 U.S. 43 (1958); *Benny v. Loew’s Inc.*, 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956); *Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P.F. Collier & Son Co.*, 26 U.S.P.Q. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). For an analysis of courts’ application of fair use under the 1909 Copyright Act, see Alan Latman, *Study No. 14: Fair Use of Copyrighted Works*, in 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT: ARTHUR FISHER MEMORIAL EDITION 781, 783–93 (Copyright Soc’y of U.S.A. eds., 1963).

24. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall have power . . . to promote the progress of science”); *Rosemont Enter. v. Random House, Inc.*, 366 F.2d 303, 306–311 (1966) (applying fair use when enforcement of copyright, by rightowner who sought to suppress information, would frustrate the progress of science).

25. Thanks to Wendy J. Gordon for this observation.

26. But not as provocatively as, for example, Robert P. Merges, who has suggested that fair use across the board obliges authors to subsidize user-beneficiaries. See Robert P. Merges, *The End of Friction? Property Rights In The ‘Newtonian’ World Of On-line Commerce*, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 115–16 (1997).

“property right” will similarly contest the proposition that fair use effectively requires authors to underwrite free uses in the public interest.) Second, and primarily in the case of distribution uses developed by new (generally commercial) market entrants, “market failure” may justify both those uses that are as a practical matter insusceptible to licensing, notably because of their volume, and (more controversially) those whose licensing may be possible but whose licensors are unreasonably intractable.²⁷ Perhaps unsurprisingly, courts do not generally announce the latter basis, since it both implies second-guessing business decisions and ascribes sinister motivations to the refusal to license. As a result, those who invoke this justification are often unsuccessful.²⁸ Nonetheless, I believe it underlies some fair use decisions, notably the Ninth Circuit’s recent holding in *DISH Networks*,²⁹ whose fair use analysis (like the cursory and result-oriented fair use analysis in the Supreme Court’s *Sony* decision³⁰ on which it relies) is otherwise unconvincing, at best.

The following discussion considers two kinds of new distribution fair uses: first, social-subsidy fair use, including nonprofit education and libraries; second, market-failure/new-market use, including private copying and mass digitization.

27. A great deal has been written on market-failure fair use since Wendy J. Gordon’s seminal 1982 article in the Columbia Law Review. See Wendy J. Gordon, *Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors*, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982); see also Tom W. Bell, *Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine*, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557 (1998); Julie E. Cohen, *Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of Rights Management*, 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998); David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, *The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction*, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61 (2005); Alan L. Durham, *Consumer Modification of Copyrighted Works*, 81 IND. L.J. 851 (2006); Edward Lee, *Technological Fair Use*, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797 (2010); Maureen A. O’Rourke, *Towards a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law*, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000); Robert Merges, *The End of Friction*, *supra* note 26; Neil Weinstock Netanel, *Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society*, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996); Jennifer M. Urban, *How Fair Use Can Solve the Orphan Works Problem*, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1379 (2012).

28. See, e.g., *A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.*, 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting defense that end-user filesharing was fair use; court observed that licensed downloads were in prospect); *UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc.*, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting defendant’s contention that MP3 storage product was fair use because plaintiff failed to show that licensing in this area was not “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed” (quoting *Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc.*, 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994))). Cf. *Texaco*, 60 F.3d at 930–31 (rejecting market-failure argument on grounds that market failure no longer existed due to emerging licensing market).

29. *Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C.*, 723, F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013).

30. *Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.*, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).

A. SOCIAL-SUBSIDY FAIR USE

1. Nonprofit Educational Uses

a) Photocopying and the 1976 Act

Section 107(1) identifies “nonprofit educational purposes” as a use whose “nature” and “purpose” favor a finding of fair use.³¹ The preamble to section 107 lists among the uses which in general exemplify fair use (but which courts must in each case examine) “teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use).”³² Thus, as the Supreme Court has recognized, the 1976 Act specifies one form of use that does not involve new creativity,³³ though the contours of this redistributive use remain undefined, and the inclusion of a use in the preamble does not confer a presumption of “fairness.” Educational photocopying was in fact one of the most contested issues during the legislative process leading up to the 1976 Act.³⁴ The “Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational Institutions With Respect to Books and Periodicals”³⁵ (“Guidelines”) that emerged from this process offers some indication of Congress’s intention regarding the scope of fair use.

I do not wish to overemphasize the inferences to draw from the Guidelines, in part because they are highly contested,³⁶ and because by their own terms, they identify a minimum threshold, in effect a safe harbor, thus leaving open the possibility of more extensive permissible free use.³⁷ But

31. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2012).

32. *Id.* § 107(2).

33. See *Campbell v. Acuff-Rose*, 510 U.S. 569, 579 n.11 (1994) (“The obvious statutory exception to this focus on transformative uses is the straight reproduction of multiple copies for classroom distribution.”).

34. See, e.g., Jessica D. Litman, *Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History*, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 887–88 (1987).

35. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 68–73 (1976).

36. Compare *Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc.*, 99 F.3d 1381, 1390–91 (6th Cir. 1996) (Guidelines provide useful guidance), with *Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker*, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1227–29 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (criticizing Guidelines’ legitimacy). For academic commentary critical of the Guidelines, see, e.g., Kenneth D. Crews, *The Law of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair Use Guidelines*, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (2001); Gregory K. Klingsporn, *The Conference on Fair Use (CONFU) and the Future of Fair Use Guidelines*, 23 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 101 (1999); Litman, *supra* note 34; Jennifer E. Rothman, *Best Intentions: Reconsidering Best Practices Statements In the Context of Fair Use and Copyright Law*, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 371 (2010); Carol M. Silberberg, Note, *Preserving Educational Fair Use in the Twenty-First Century*, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (2001).

37. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 68 (1976) (“[T]he following statement of guidelines is not intended to limit the types of copying permitted under the standards of fair use under judicial decision and which are stated in Section 107 of the Copyright Revision Bill. There

several features of the Guidelines suggest that they focus on the acts of individual teachers. For example, in addition to a “brevity” component, the Guidelines specify “spontaneity” (“the inspiration and decision to use the work and the moment of its use for maximum teaching effectiveness are so close in time that it would be unreasonable to expect a timely reply to a request for permission”)³⁸; they limit multiple copying to no more than nine instances during a term; and perhaps most significantly, with respect to the intended beneficiary, “the copying of the material is for only one course in the school in which the copies are made.”³⁹ One may, therefore, query whether systematic copying, particularly of substantial course materials,⁴⁰ by the educational institution, falls so far outside the Guidelines’ ambit as to exceed even the Guidelines’ undefined additional breathing space.

By the same token, the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee casts doubt on the application of fair use to institutional educational copying. The Committee surmised:

The fair use doctrine in the case of classroom copying would apply primarily to the situation of a teacher who, acting individually and at his own volition, makes one or more copies for temporary use by himself or his pupils in the classroom. A different result is indicated where the copying was done by the educational institution, school system, or larger unit or where copying was required or suggested by the school administration, either in special instances or as part of a general plan.⁴¹

Educational institutions, however, have not been the defendants in most of the cases involving educational copying. Although publishers sued New York University in the early 1980s over its systematic preparation of coursepacks, the case settled.⁴² The other photocopying decisions involved

may be instances in which copying which does not fall within the guidelines stated below may nonetheless be permitted under the criteria of fair use.”).

38. *Id.* at 69.

39. *Id.*

40. The Guidelines also state: “Copying shall not be used to create or to replace or substitute for anthologies, compilations or collective works.” *Id.* at 69.

41. S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 63 (1975).

42. The case, *Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. New York University*, No. 82 CIV 8333 (ADS), 1983 WL 1134 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983), settled “on terms which included the incorporation of the Classroom Guidelines into the University’s official photocopying policies.” Bernard Zidar, Comment, *Fair Use and the Code of the Schoolyard: Can Copyshops Compile Coursepacks Consistent with Copyright?*, 46 EMORY L.J. 1363, 1377 (1997) (outlining history of *Addison* and other early photocopying cases).

commercial actors,⁴³ thus considerably attenuating the “public benefit” conferred by the unauthorized preparation of coursepacks. A decision rendered shortly after the enactment of the 1976 Act, *Encyclopedia Britannica v. Crooks*,⁴⁴ however, did involve educational copying (videotaping, not photocopying) by institutional defendants, but the facts of the case did not favor the application of fair use to institutional-level nonprofit educational copying. There, the producers of educational videos charged that defendant school districts, comprising over one hundred schools, videotaped television broadcasts of their works, built a library of these videotaped works, and made copies of these tapes for classroom use. Because educational institutions constituted the principal market for the plaintiffs’ works, the school districts’ systematic copying substituted for purchases of the programs. The economic impact exceeded reasonable fair use tolerance even for publicly beneficial goals.⁴⁵

More recently, however, a district court has found fair use in a case involving institutional-level creation of “electronic reserves,” arguably the digital-era equivalent of photocopied coursepacks.⁴⁶

b) Digital Copying

In *Cambridge University Press v. Becker*,⁴⁷ three academic publishers contended that Georgia State University systematically infringed their copyrights by adopting a policy that permitted faculty members to make excerpts from the plaintiffs’ works as electronic course reserves through the university library’s website. The university’s 2009 Copyright Policy allegedly “led to continuing abuse of the fair use privilege”⁴⁸ by “mak[ing] professors responsible for determining whether a particular use is a fair use”⁴⁹ and requiring the professor to complete a “fair use checklist” to do so.⁵⁰ The

43. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1389 (6th Cir. 1996); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d. 913, 922 (2d. Cir. 1994); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1532 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

44. *Encyclopedia Britannica v. Crooks*, 542 F. Supp. 1155–56, 1174 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).

45. *Id.* at 1174–79.

46. *Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker*, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1201–02 (N.D. Ga. 2012).

47. *Id.* While I have classified coursepacks and electronic reserves as forms of reiterative copying, one might contend that the selection of excerpts to copy results in a kind of anthology, which might be considered not merely a new use but a new work; that there may be some authorship component to the selection of materials to copy does not compel such a recharacterization. The *Georgia State* court did not consider the copying at issue to be “transformative.” *Id.* at 1232 (“Taking into account the fact that this case involves only mirror-image, nontransformative uses . . .”).

48. *Id.* at 1203.

49. *Id.* at 1219.

50. *Id.*

plaintiffs identified seventy-five instances of alleged infringement during the three full semesters after the Copyright Policy was adopted. Faculty members had assigned the excerpts at issue as supplemental (but often required) reading in graduate or upper-level undergraduate courses in language or social science. The books from which the excerpts came were generally not textbooks, but rather single-author monographs or edited collections of multiple chapters by a variety of authors. The “great majority” of the excerpts at issue constituted “a chapter or less from a multi-chapter book.”⁵¹ The average copied excerpt constituted about 10% of the book from which it was copied “(though some were considerably more and some were considerably less).”⁵² Excerpts placed on electronic reserve were available by password only to students enrolled in the course, and only during the semester in which the student was enrolled, but students could create permanent retention copies by downloading or printing the reserve readings for their courses.

Following a bench trial, the court found most of the copying to be fair use. Evaluating “the purpose and the character of the use,” the court concluded that the first factor favored fair use, because the copying fulfilled the section 107 preamble-listed purposes of teaching students and for scholarship and was performed by a nonprofit educational institution “for strictly nonprofit educational purposes.”⁵³ The court distinguished the photocopy cases, whose defendants were for-profit entities. Pointing to the statute’s explicit inclusion of classroom copies, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the non-creative nature of the copying weighed against fair use. Applying the second factor, the court deemed the works primarily informational, hence more subject to fair use. The final two factors furnished the most significant, and debatable, aspects of the court’s analysis.

With respect to the third factor, the “amount and substantiality of the portion used, in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,” the court attributed little significance to the Classroom Guidelines. Since the Guidelines’ safe harbor set the minimum standards of educational fair use, not the maximum, the court concluded that the outcome of this factor’s analysis did not turn on meeting the Guidelines requirements. Turning instead to the text of the third factor, the court addressed the question of what constituted “the copyrighted work as a whole,” in relation to which the amount and substantiality of the defendant’s copying should be evaluated. Although the publishers urged that each chapter of their copyrighted books

51. *Id.* at 1233.

52. *Id.* at 1227.

53. *Id.* at 1224.

should be seen as a separate work, so that copying an entire chapter would constitute copying the entire work, the court ruled that the argument was not timely raised.⁵⁴ Moreover, conflating copyright ownership with the identification of the “work,” the court indicated that since the publishers had obtained copyright assignments from the authors of the separate contributions to edited volumes, those contributions should not be assessed separately for purposes of fair use analysis, lest the publishers “choke out nonprofit educational use of the chapter as a fair use.” The court “w[ould] not allow this to happen,”⁵⁵ and therefore analyzed the substantiality of the copying with respect to the book as a whole.⁵⁶

Of course, an amount quantitatively insubstantial with respect to the book as a whole could be qualitatively substantial, and therefore weigh against fair use,⁵⁷ but the court determined that because the books were divided into distinct topics, the copied excerpts lacked “a dominant relationship to the substance of the work as a whole.”⁵⁸ It is not clear what this standard means, but it appears to make qualitative insubstantiality an inevitable consequence of addressing more than one topic per book. Moreover,

it is relevant that selection of a whole chapter of a book (either from a typical, single author chapter book or from an edited book) likely will serve a more valuable educational purpose than an excerpt containing a few isolated paragraphs. Professors want students to absorb ideas and useful, context-based information. This can be accomplished better through chapter assignments than through truncated paragraphs. However, the selected excerpt must fill a demonstrated, legitimate purpose in the course curriculum and must be narrowly tailored to accomplish that purpose.⁵⁹

Thus, more copying is called for rather than less, especially since a court is unlikely to second-guess the instructor’s determination—by virtue of assigning the excerpt—that the excerpt “fills a legitimate purpose in the course curriculum . . . ”⁶⁰ The same consideration that the publishers

54. *Id.* at 1231–32.

55. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1234 (N.D. Ga. 2012).

56. By contrast, in *Texaco*, the court addressed not only the journal issue as a whole, but treated each article as a “work” for purposes of the analyses of substantiality and market impact. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d. at 926.

57. Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2250–51 (1985) (finding that a small quantity of the work can constitute the “heart” of the work and weigh against fair use).

58. *Cambridge*, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1233.

59. *Id.*

60. *Id.* at 1233, 1243.

signaled as evidence of the qualitative substantiality of the excerpt instead bolsters the defense that the institution took no more than appropriate to the pedagogical task.

In any event, the court's treatment of the fourth factor, the effect on the potential market for or value of the work, arguably rendered irrelevant its analysis of the amount and substantiality of the copying, apart from its determination that the copyrighted "works" at issue were the whole books in which the copied excerpts appeared. The court viewed the danger of market substitution as the principal concern under this factor, and set the substitution threshold at ten percent of the book as a whole. The court in effect created a bright-line presumption in favor of fair use if the defendant copied no more than ten percent of the pages of a book containing fewer than ten chapters, or up to but not more than one chapter of a book with ten or more chapters.⁶¹

Whatever the merits of the ten-percent free pass, the court's treatment of excerpts in excess of ten percent suggests a useful approach of broader potential application, as we will see in subsequent sections of this article. The court acknowledged the significance of the market for licensing excerpts (even if the full book supplies the reference point for the quantum of copying), and the deleterious impact on the value of the work were licensing fees to go unpaid. But the court concluded that "[f]or loss of potential license revenue to cut against fair use, the evidence must show that licenses for excerpts of the works at issue are easily accessible, reasonably priced, and that they offered excerpts in a format which is reasonably convenient for users."⁶² Otherwise the unlicensed use would likely be ruled fair. For many of the works at issue, the court concluded that the record did not establish that licenses for digital copies of the works were available in 2009 when the defendants put the excerpts at issue on electronic reserve. Where "digital permissions were not shown to be available," the court ruled that the defendants' use "caused no actual or potential damage to the value of the books' copyrights."⁶³ Where digital permissions were available, by contrast, the court ruled that the fourth factor would weigh heavily against fair use.⁶⁴

61. Author's note: the Eleventh Circuit reversed the imposition of a 10% presumption, ruling that it lacked statutory basis, and that all factors must be weighed together. *Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton*, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014).

62. *Cambridge*, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1237.

63. *Id.* at 1238. Author's Note: the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court "did not err" in this aspect of its fourth factor analysis. *Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton*, 769 F.3d 1232. 1281. (11th Cir. 2014)

64. The court accordingly found five instances of use it deemed not "fair." See also *Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker*, No. 1:08-CV-1425-ODE, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123154 (N.D. Ga. August 10, 2012) (relief for five instances of copyright infringement).

In other words, the court instituted a “license it or lose it” system. Or, more accurately, the court gave ten percent off the top to the educational institution (this is the social-welfare subsidy) and then imposed a solution akin to a compulsory license. Except that where compulsory licenses in copyright have traditionally been creatures of legislation, with government-set rates, here the court in effect compelled the copyright owners to license, lest the use be allowed for free, but left the rate-setting to the parties, subject, perhaps, to judicial verification that the licenses “are easily accessible [and] reasonably priced.”⁶⁵ We will return to “license it or lose it” when we address copyright exceptions for distribution uses in other countries, and in our proposals for U.S. copyright reform.

c) Library Uses

Library uses present another instance of social-subsidy fair use. Unlike educational photocopying (whose partial “Guidelines” appear in an appendix to the report of the House Judiciary Committee), specified types of library copying received explicit statutory coverage in section 108 of the 1976 Act. Section 108, however, was drafted with such specificity that, despite some updating in 1998, it has failed to keep pace with digital technologies.⁶⁶ Section 108 nonetheless points to further flexibility by cautioning that “[n]othing in this section . . . in any way affects the rights of fair use as provided by section 107 . . .”⁶⁷

*Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust*⁶⁸ tested the relationship between the two provisions. The Second Circuit announced a broad fair use privilege to create and store digital copies of entire books for purposes of “data mining” of full text and to enable access to the contents of books by the visually impaired. The Second Circuit rejected the authors’ contention that the constraints contained within section 108, notably disallowing “systematic” reproductions, limited the scope of fair use.⁶⁹ The court addressed the two uses separately. Looking at the output of data in response to search queries rather than the input of the full contents of books into the database, the court found the data-mining uses “quintessentially transformative . . . we

65. *Cambridge*, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1237.

66. See, e.g., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE SECTION 108 STUDY GROUP REPORT, at i (2008) (“Due to the rapid pace of technological and social change, the law embodies some now-outmoded assumptions about technology, behavior, professional practices, and business models.”).

67. 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(4) (2012).

68. *Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust*, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014), *aff’g* 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).

69. *Id.* at 94 n.4.

can discern little or no resemblance between the original text and the results of the H[athi]Trust] D[igital] L[ibrary] full-text search.”⁷⁰ Not only did the data mining uses not generate any output of copyrightable expression, but the nature of the use corresponded to a purpose entirely different from those covered by more conventional uses: “There is no evidence that the Authors write with the purpose of enabling text searches of their books. Consequently, the full-text search function does not supersede[] the objects [or purposes] of the original creation.”⁷¹ The second and third factors were quickly dispatched: the nature of the copied work was “not dispositive,” and the amount and substantiality of the copying corresponded to the purpose of the copying, which was to reproduce the full text of the books.⁷²

The first-factor finding of “transformative use” essentially dictated the court’s analysis of the fourth factor, for “under Factor Four, any economic ‘harm’ caused by transformative uses does not count because such uses, by definition, do not serve as substitutes for the original work.”⁷³ The court has thus drawn the explicit conclusion suggested in earlier decisions in which it indicated that a “transformative use” fills a transformative market, which did not substitute for the work’s usual markets.⁷⁴ A “transformative use,” then, by definition exploits a non-traditional market. That the new market is one that copyright owners might come to develop apparently does not matter; the court gave short shrift to the authors’ contended economic harm from lost licensing opportunities.⁷⁵ This dismissal of prospective markets can be

70. *Id.* at 97.

71. *Id.* (quoting *Campbell v. Acuff-Rose*, 510 U.S. at 579) (internal quotation marks omitted).

72. *Id.* at 98–99. On fair use and data mining, see generally, Matthew Sag, *Orphan Works as Grist for the Data Mill*, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1503 (2012) (non-expressive uses of copyrighted works do not infringe copyright).

73. *Id.* at 99.

74. See, e.g., *Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd.*, 448 F.3d 605, 614–15 (2d Cir. 2006); *Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc.*, 150 F.3d 132, 146 n.11 (2d Cir. 1998). Cf. *A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.*, 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001) (“lack of harm to an established market cannot deprive the copyright holder of the right to develop alternative markets for the works. *See L.A. Times v. Free Republic*, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669, 54 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1453, 1469–71 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (stating that online market for plaintiff newspapers’ articles was harmed because plaintiffs demonstrated that “[defendants] are attempting to exploit the market for viewing their articles online”)).

75. *HathiTrust*, 755 F.3d at 100:

This theory of market harm does not work under Factor Four, because the full-text search function does not serve as a substitute for the books that are being searched. [Citations omitted] Thus, it is irrelevant that the Libraries might be willing to purchase licenses in order to engage in this transformative use (if the use were deemed unfair). Lost licensing revenue

reconciled with the text of the fourth factor, which directs courts to consider “the effect of the use upon the *potential* market for or value of the copyrighted work,”⁷⁶ if one concludes that the to-be-developed market is normatively objectionable, as the Supreme Court had held in rejecting the concept of a licensing market for parodies.⁷⁷ The normative conclusion that there is no market for the contested use, however, may be more apt for productive uses that generate new works, particularly those critical of the copied work, than for uses that entail unaltered copying of the entire work. If the same conclusion pertains in the latter cases, the court has probably concluded that the use should be allowed in any event; attaching the “transformative” label to the use will determine the outcome of the market harm inquiry: if the market is “transformative,” there is no cognizable harm because impairment to a transformative, as opposed to a traditional, market doesn’t count. Thus, if the use is “transformative,” the four-factor statutory test effectively reduces to a single factor.

The Second Circuit assessed the transformativeness of the use differently with respect to the copying for access by the print-disabled. The district court had held that the visually impaired formed an audience distinct from the readers to whom the copyright owners marketed the books: “[P]rovision of access for them was not the intended use of the original work (enjoyment and use by sighted persons) and this use is transformative.”⁷⁸ Recognizing that this rationale comes perilously close to suggesting that anytime a third party develops a new audience for the work, distribution of the work to that audience is “transformative,” the Second Circuit reined in the enthusiasm of the district court: “This is a misapprehension; providing expanded access to the print disabled is not ‘transformative.’ . . . By making copyrighted works available in formats accessible to the disabled, the HDL enables a larger audience to read those works, but the underlying purpose of the HDL’s use is the same as the author’s original purpose.”⁷⁹ But, the court went on, “[w]hile a transformative use generally is more likely to qualify as fair use, transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use.”⁸⁰ Copying for the print disabled still qualified as a fair use because the amount of copying was commensurate to the task (factor three), and publishers do

counts under factor four only when the use serves as a substitute for the original and the full text search use does not.

76. 17 U.S.C. § 107(40) (emphasis added).

77. *See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.*, 510 U.S. 569, 591–92 (1994).

78. Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 461 (2d Cir. 2012).

79. *HathiTrust*, 755 F.3d at 101.

80. *Id.* at 101–02, quoting *Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P.*, 742 F.3d 17, 28 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

not make their works available in blind-friendly formats, so there is no cognizable market harm.⁸¹

A perceived social imperative may well underlie the court's rather cavalier treatment of the potential licensing markets with respect to both kinds of use. The district court, in concluding its fair use analysis, declared:

I cannot imagine a definition of fair use that would not encompass the transformative uses made by Defendants' M[ass] D[igitization] P[roject] and would require that I terminate this invaluable contribution to the progress of science and cultivation of the arts that at the same time effectuates the ideals espoused by the A[mericans with] D[isabilities] A[ct].⁸²

The Second Circuit eschewed the lower court's rhetorical flourishes, but it surely perceived no lesser public benefit from the *HathiTrust* Digital Library than did the S.D.N.Y. One should nonetheless note the district court's assumption that were the fair use defense to fail, the libraries' socially beneficial initiatives would have to be "terminated." If the choice is all-or-nothing, a fair use outcome is assured. But, as the *Georgia State* ruling suggests, the *HathiTrust* district court may have embraced a false dichotomy. Admittedly, in *Georgia State*, a licensing mechanism, through the Copyright Clearance Center, already existed, but it was not adequate to the task at the time the electronic-reserves program began. The Georgia federal court's ruling surely will provide the impetus to improve the licensing program so that it does respond to the demand. *HathiTrust* does not even give licensing a chance.

One might rejoin that there is no need to license if the use is fair,⁸³ and that indeed appears to be the approach of the Second Circuit. In other words, *HathiTrust* appears to be a case in which the public benefit was so compelling (and the market harm so trivialized) that the use should be free of restraint and free of charge even if it could be licensed. But if the use is fair because it supposedly cannot be reasonably licensed, then nipping licensing in the bud deprives the author of compensation and gives the user an

81. "Transformativeness" thus appears to be a one-way ratchet: if the use is transformative, it is highly likely to be deemed "fair," but there is no negative inference: non-transformative uses may nonetheless be deemed "fair" as well.

82. *HathiTrust*, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 464.

83. See, e.g., Matthew Africa, *The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts*, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1145, 1148–49 (2000); Gordon, *supra* note 13, at 1824–25. See generally Mark Lemley, *Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?*, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (2007). This objection, however, primarily arises in the context of new works rather than new distributions.

unwarranted free pass.⁸⁴ This brings us to the second class of distribution uses, characterized not by social benefit, but by “market failure.”

B. MARKET-FAILURE/NEW-MARKET FAIR USE

“Market failure” may mean many things to many courts and commentators. I am here using it in the sense proposed by Wendy J. Gordon as “market malfunction” rather than what she calls “inherent limitation,” which I understand to import a normative gloss: a market *could* function, but policy reasons make such markets undesirable.⁸⁵ When a large populace engages in a multitude of non-creative uses, particularly in the digital environment, the cost of seeking and paying for authorization may be prohibitive for each potential user, so that enforcement of the copyright might yield few sales and little advantage for the copyright owner. The public interest (here equated with that of the user) in the new form of distribution thus would be frustrated, with insufficient countervailing benefit to creators (were there such a benefit, it would serve the long-term interest of the public in ensuring that we “have a supply of good books”⁸⁶). If “market failure” primarily concerns practical inability to develop a paying market, a variant on the theme of “market malfunction” is unwillingness to develop the market.

84. There may, however, be other justifications, such as solicitude for the visually-impaired, to allow the use for free.

85. See Wendy J. Gordon, *Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Transaction Costs Have Always Been Only Part of the Story*, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 149, 151–53 (2003). Campbell v. Acuff-Rose is a good example of an “inherent limitation”: when the Court announced there was “the law recognizes no derivative market for critical works, including parody,” it was making a normative, not an empirical, declaration. 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1993). The Second Circuit’s *HathiTrust* decision offers another example of “inherent limitation.” Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014).

86. 56 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3rd ser.) (1840) 346 (U.K.). Many commentators cite Macaulay’s characterization of copyright as an “exceedingly bad” “tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers,” without acknowledging that in the same speech, Macaulay also said:

The advantages arising from a system of copyright are obvious. It is desirable that we should have a supply of good books; we cannot have such a supply unless men of letters are liberally remunerated; and the least objectionable way of remunerating them is by means of copyright. You cannot depend for literary instruction and amusement on the leisure of men occupied in the pursuits of active life. Such men may occasionally produce pieces of great merit. But you must not look to them for works which require deep meditation and long research. Such works you can expect only from persons who make literature the business of their lives. . . . Such men must be remunerated for their literary labour. And there are only two ways in which they can be remunerated. One of those ways is patronage [which Macaulay excoriated]; the other is copyright. *Id.* at 346–47.

While the exclusive rights copyright vests in authors normally entitle them to decide whether and how to exploit their works, courts have on occasion rejected infringement claims in order to allow the new market to emerge,⁸⁷ or in order to counter perceived copyright-owner abuse.⁸⁸ (The two variants, moreover, are not mutually exclusive, with the latter sometimes reinforcing the former.⁸⁹) The examples I will consider are private copying and mass digitization. Mass digitization in turn covers “orphan works,” databases of copyrighted works, of which Google’s book-scanning program is the leading instance, and image search engines.

1. Private Copying

As end users already, and will increasingly, enjoy copyrighted works of all kinds through licensed access-based models,⁹⁰ the market-failure problem of private copying may appear vestigial. “On demand” transmissions may replace both retention and “time-shifting” copies, for there is no need to “time shift” when one can receive the work at any time, and no need to possess a copy if the content is accessible at will. (Indeed, given the evolution of the hardcopy media in which works may be fixed, “cloud” accessibility may be preferable to having to update one’s collection, for example, from recordable tape to burnable CDs to memory chips on portable devices, and

87. See, e.g., *Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.*, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).

88. “Copyright trolling” occurs when the owners of copyrights (not the original authors of the copyrighted works) bring infringement claims with the sole goal of profiting through litigation, usually by forcing quick settlements. A notable example of a “troll” is Righthaven, LLC, which has brought numerous infringement claims in recent years. See, e.g., *Righthaven, LLC v. Va. Citizens Def. League, Inc.*, No. 2:10-CV-01683-GMN, 2011 WL 2550627 (D. Nev. June 23, 2011) (suing nonprofit group for posting article on website); *Righthaven, LLC v. Hoehn*, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1151 (D. Nev. 2011) (suing individual posting of copyrighted work in an online forum); *Righthaven, LCC v. Jama*, No. 2:10-CV-1322 JCM (LRL), 2011 WL 1541613 (D. Nev. Apr. 22, 2011) (suing nonprofit group as in *Va. Citizens Def. League*, with court noting that use of copyright by plaintiffs “has been shown to be nothing more than litigation-driven”). See also Brad A. Greenberg, *Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses*, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 53, 111–14 (2014) (suggesting bad faith should lead to a presumption of fair use).

89. According to a leading account of the business backstory to the Sony “Betamax case,” the studios were endeavoring to shut down the video tape recorder in favor of the playback-only video-disk technology that the studios had licensed. See JAMES LARDNER, *FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND THE ONSLAUGHT OF THE VCR* 28–36 (1st ed. 1987).

90. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, *From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law*, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 113, 124–25 (2003).

so on.) U.S. caselaw does not in any event support a general private copying fair use exception for retention copies;⁹¹ an exception does in effect exist for analog copies of musical recordings,⁹² and another is in place for an “additional copy or adaptation” copy of computer programs,⁹³ but they are the fruits of specific legislation, not fair use litigation. The Supreme Court in *Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios*⁹⁴ did, however, rule (on a rather cursory, and now partly abandoned, analysis⁹⁵) that time shifting of free broadcast television was a fair use. I will not here rehearse the reasoning and critiques of *Sony* other than to observe that the five-Justice majority may have perceived an all-or-nothing choice: extending fair use to copying entire works for the same consumption purpose for which they were disseminated was a significant departure from prior law (as the Ninth Circuit had emphasized below⁹⁶), but limiting fair use to what was then called “productive” use of limited portions of prior works could have meant depriving the American public of a widely available and extremely popular device whose use, five Justices concluded, was not harming the copyright owners’ television broadcast market.⁹⁷ (As the dissent stressed, the majority gave scant consideration to the new markets that time-shifting would spawn.⁹⁸)

91. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d. 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting fair use defense for company engaged in creating digital readily accessible copies of subscribers’ CDs).

92. See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2012) (no infringement action “based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of [an analog recording device] . . . for making . . . analog musical recordings”).

93. *Id.* § 117(a).

94. *Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios*, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).

95. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, *The Story of Sony v. Universal Studios: Mary Poppins Meets the Boston Strangler*, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 358 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, eds., 2006) (detailing the aspects of *Sony* from which the Court has retreated, such as the predominant significance of commercial use, and those which retain vitality, such as much of the contributory infringement analysis); Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, *Legal Realism in Action: Indirect Copyright Liability’s Continuing Tort Framework and Sony’s De Facto Demise*, 55 UCLA L. REV. 143 (2007).

96. *Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am.*, 659 F.2d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 1981), *rev’d*, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (“[T]he result of applying fair use to intrinsic use cases like *Williams & Wilkins Co.* and this case is a fundamental restructuring of the copyright system not justified by the statutory scheme or traditional notions of fair use.”). The preamble to section 107, in identifying fair use purposes such as “teaching,” included “multiple copies for classroom use.” While the copies did not yield new works, the classroom pedagogical use could be deemed productive rather than “intrinsic”)

97. Accord Paul Goldstein, *Fair Use in Context*, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433, 439 (2008).

98. *Sony*, 464 U.S. at 497–98 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The Court has struggled mightily to show that VTR use has not *reduced* the value of the Studios’ copyrighted works in their *present* markets. Even if true, that showing only begins the proper inquiry. The

Given *Sony's* failure to blossom into a general fair use private copying privilege,⁹⁹ and the court's subsequent retreat from its emphasis on the significance of commercial use, one may wonder whether *Sony* retains relevance. Indeed, some have suggested that if the Court had it to do over again today, it might come out differently, notably because video recorders now offer playback without commercials.¹⁰⁰ Another reason to query the continued persuasiveness of *Sony's* fourth-factor analysis (the only factor on which the court bestowed any sustained analysis) is the burgeoning conflict between time-shifting and video-on-demand. *Fox Broadcasting v. DISH Network*¹⁰¹ illustrates the conflict, and demonstrates how a well-advised entrepreneur can structure its copyright-dependent technology in order to fit a new business model within fair use boundaries even in the absence of the usual normative or market-failure justifications.

Dish Network, a satellite TV transmission service which retransmits television programming under license, offers its customers the Hopper, a set-top box with both digital video recording and video-on-demand capabilities. Dish's "PrimeTime Anytime" ("PTAT") feature allows subscribers to set a single timer on the Hopper to record and store on the Hopper all primetime programming on any of the four major broadcast networks each night of the week. Finally, Dish's AutoHop feature enables users to skip commercials in PTAT recordings. Fox charged Dish with direct and contributory infringement. The Ninth Circuit rejected the claim of direct infringement, on the (dubious)¹⁰² ground that only the user "made" the PTAT copies.¹⁰³ Fox's

development of the VTR has created a new market for the works produced by the Studios."). See also Wendy J. Gordon, *Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors*, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1620–23 (1982).

99. Or to impel legislation generally to authorize but provide compensation for private audio and video copying, apart from a very specific and largely obsolete law on digital audio tape recorders. See 17 U.S.C., §§ 1001–10 (2012). That said, the popular practice of making media-shifting copies of copies lawfully acquired, for example, by ripping music from CDs to load onto one's iPhone, or to store in one's "cloud," has become so widespread that it may have become de facto fair use. That the practice may not yet be de jure fair use may be ascribed to apparent reluctance on the part of the copyright owners to challenge it. The Supreme Court, in *ABC v. Aereo*, appears to view a user's posting a copy of a work to her cloud storage to come within her possessory relationship to the copy. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2014).

100. See, e.g., Michael A. Einhorn, *Internet Television and Copyright Licensing: Balancing Cents and Sensibility*, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321 (2002); Randal C. Picker, *The Digital Video Recorder: Unbundling Advertising and Content*, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 205 (2004); Ned Snow, *The TiVo Question: Does Skipping Commercials Violate Copyright Law?*, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27 (2006).

101. *Fox Broad. Co. v. DISH Network*, 723 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2013).

102. See Jane C. Ginsburg, *Recent Developments in US Copyright—Part II, Caselaw: Exclusive Rights on the Ebb*, 218 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 167, 215–29 (2008)

contributory liability claim turned on a finding of primary infringement by Dish's customers. Applying *Sony*, the Ninth Circuit determined that Dish's customers were engaging in non-commercial fair use time-shifting. The commercial-skipping feature, the court ruled, did not affect the analysis of the economic impact of the copying, because the television producer was not the copyright owner of the commercials.

Losing the commercials may well have had a deleterious impact, but the court found that the harm did not derive from any act that infringed any copyright of Fox's. Similarly, while Fox licensed its programming to other on-demand services such as Hulu, with which Dish's service competed, “the ease of skipping commercials, rather than the on-demand availability of Fox programs, causes any market harm. And as we have discussed, the commercial-skipping does not implicate any copyright interest.”¹⁰⁴

This astoundingly obtuse analysis recalls the Ninth Circuit's decision in *Visa International Service Association*,¹⁰⁵ in which the panel majority (over Judge Kozinski's trenchant dissent) granted the credit-card-payment provider's motion to dismiss a contributory infringement claim on the ground that the commission of the infringement did not require processing the payment. As a matter of technology, it is true that the copies could be made and distributed without the intervention of Visa. But, as Judge Kozinski stressed, the pirate enterprise whose transactions Visa processed wouldn't be making and distributing infringing copies if it couldn't be paid for it.¹⁰⁶ In *Dish Network*, the question should not have been whether Fox had any copyright interest in the advertisements that the Dish customers copied but did not view (indeed, imagine a version of AutoHop which recognizes commercials

(criticizing Second Circuit's analysis of who “makes” the copy). Cf. Nat'l Rugby League Invs. Proprietary Ltd. v. Singtel Optus Proprietary Ltd., [2012] FCR 59 (Austl.) (rejecting Second Circuit's analysis and finding provider of remote DVR service to have “made” the copy, perhaps in conjunction with the end user).

103. The Supreme Court's decision in *ABC v. Aereo*, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014), did not address the question of who “makes” an automated on-demand copy. The majority's analysis of the public performance right concluded that Aereo “performed” the broadcast television programming that it retransmitted to its subscribers via personalized antennas and individualized streams of the digitized signal. The dissenters, adopting the “volition” analysis propounded by the Second Circuit in *Cartoon Network v CSC Holdings*, 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), had contended that the automated nature of Aereo's service should have characterized Aereo as a mere provider of equipment enabling the subscribers to “perform” the broadcast programs that the subscribers requested be retransmitted to their devices. To the extent the majority's analysis can be read as rejecting the “volition” predicate to determining “who performs” a copyrighted work, the analysis may also undermine a similar prerequisite to determining “who copies” a work of authorship.

104. *Fox Broadcasting Co., Inc.*, 723 F.3d at 1076.

105. *Perfect 10 v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n*, 494 F.3d 788, 809 (9th Cir. 2007).

106. *Id.* at 817–19.

and, instead of fast-forwarding through them, does not record them in the first place; then, even if Fox had owned those copyrights, they would not have been infringed precisely because the customers did *not* copy them; nonetheless, the economic effect in all cases remains the same). What allows free broadcast television (and Fox's free licensing to Hulu and other internet services, provided they retain the ads) to be free are the advertisements; take these away and the business model becomes unsustainable. The "value of the work" accordingly diminishes as a result of the third-party copying and commercial skipping.

Thus, while licensed on-demand transmissions may in general be displacing private copying, entrepreneurs can, in effect, structure the enabling of end-user time-shifting to afford most of the convenience of video-on-demand (the selection of programming will not be infinite; it will be limited to whatever is broadcast over the four networks in the course of a week) without the pesky commercials (and, of course, without paying the copyright owners). The operation is technically time-shifting; in "feel" to the consumer, however, it is essentially video-on-demand, but better. Not only does the time-shifting substitute for a licensed use (no "transformative purpose" here), but there is no inability to license on-demand access. If there is a justification for this outcome, it must be in the court's perception that business models to facilitate time-shifting that free customers from commercials are desirable and should not be suppressed by copyright owners who will not license commercial-free retransmissions. (Either that, or the following wooden syllogism: end-user non-commercial time-shifting via video tape recorder is fair use; the DVR and AutoHop offer time-shifting updated for the digital age; therefore their use is fair use too.)

2. *Mass Digitization*

Mass digitization does, at least at first blush, appear to present intractable transaction-cost problems. The number of works at issue, and the difficulty of locating their rightsholders (and even if located, obtaining the necessary rights), may make free fair use seem a desirable solution, even for copying and communication of entire works. The proposition does, however, produce an obvious anomaly: the fewer works one copies, the weaker the case for market-failure fair use; but vast, immodest, copying entitles the copyist to persist, without permission and without paying. Closer examination, moreover, suggests that the volume of copying, standing alone, does not suffice for a free pass, though difficulties in rightsholder location may justify a flexible solution. In either event, if the use is to be permitted, in many instances it should also be paid.

a) Orphan Works

The problem of “orphan works” by now is well known: would-be users who are unable to locate the copyright owner, but whose use or exploitation would not qualify for a copyright limitation or exception (such as fair use), must decide whether to renounce their projects or to incur the risk that the copyright owner will reappear once the exploitation is underway and demand both injunctive and substantial monetary relief in an ensuing infringement action. Potentially frustrated users range widely, from commercial entities who seek to reissue out-of-print works or to create new works based on orphan works, to cultural institutions, notably museums and libraries, who seek to digitize works for preservation and educational purposes,¹⁰⁷ to individuals who seek to incorporate an orphan work in their webpage or blog. The former U.S. Register of Copyrights deemed the orphan works problem “pervasive.”¹⁰⁸

When the Copyright Office first embarked on solving the problem of orphan works in 2005, the premise of its inquiry was that the use would

107. The European endeavors concerning orphan works have taken place primarily in the context of the Commission’s “i2010 initiative” on digital libraries. See *Communication from the Commission of 30 September 2005 to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, i2010: digital libraries* COM (2005) 465 final (Sept. 30, 2005); *Commission Recommendation on the Digitisation and Online Accessibility of Cultural Material and Digital Preservation*, 2006 O.J. (L 236) 28 recital 10, available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/digital_libraries/doc/recommendation/recommendation_august06/en.pdf.

108. See *The “Orphan Works” Problem and Proposed Legislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, H. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 110th Cong. Sess. 2 (2008) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights), available at <http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat031308.html>:

In fact, the most striking aspect of orphan works is that the frustrations are pervasive in a way that many copyright problems are not. When a copyright owner cannot be identified or is unlocatable, potential users abandon important, productive projects, many of which would be beneficial to our national heritage. Scholars cannot use the important letters, images and manuscripts they search out in archives or private homes, other than in the limited manner permitted by fair use or the first sale doctrine. Publishers cannot recirculate works or publish obscure materials that have been all but lost to the world. Museums are stymied in their creation of exhibitions, books, websites and other educational programs, particularly when the project would include the use of multiple works. Archives cannot make rare footage available to wider audiences. Documentary filmmakers must exclude certain manuscripts, images, sound recordings and other important source material from their films.

involve more copying, particularly as a result of digital media, than fair use could bear (for example, republication of whole books).¹⁰⁹ Analysis therefore turned to remedies: might these be structured in a way that encouraged the reuse of orphan works by lowering the (by definition, infringing) user's risk of substantial monetary exposure?¹¹⁰ More recently, however, some commentators have argued that the difficulty of locating the rightsholder should enter, and favor, the fair use calculus, so that the user owes no damages should the rightowner reappear.¹¹¹ Orphan works regimes (this Article will consider the ones in effect in the European Union and Canada in Part II) do not spare their beneficiaries transaction costs. They may in effect cap them, but by requiring that the would-be exploiter accomplish a "diligent search" for rightsholders, orphan works regimes in fact mandate potentially significant expenditures in location costs. As a result, an orphan works regime, whether based in unpaid fair use (which may raise issues of compliance with international standards for permissible exceptions¹¹²), or modifying remedies (essentially a form of permitted-but-paid, at least for exploitations occurring before the copyright owner's reappearance), or requiring payment to a fund on behalf of the missing rightowner (with escheat to local cultural initiatives should the rightowner not reappear after a certain time) is not an answer to the transactions costs problem of mass digitization. Mass digitization involves wholesale copying; orphan works regimes operate at retail. Whether for free, or permitted-but-paid, the justification for an orphan works exception lies not in a response to transaction costs, but rather in the public benefit of the reuse, particularly if the beneficiaries of the exception are nonprofit educational and library institutions.

109. UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 4 (2006) ("For purposes of developing a legislative solution we have defined the 'orphan works' situation to be one where the use goes beyond any limitation or exemption to copyright, such as fair use.").

110. Orphan Works Act of 2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. (2008) (see also S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2008)). See Jane C. Ginsburg, *Recent Developments in US Copyright—Part I, Legislative Developments: Orphan Works*, 217 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 99 (2008), available at <http://lsr.nellco.org/columbia/pltt/papers/08152/> [hereinafter RIDA].

111. See, e.g., Jennifer Urban, *How Fair Use Can Help Solve the Orphan Works Problem*, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1379 (2012) (for libraries and archives).

112. Berne Convention, *supra* note 11 at art. 9(2); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 13, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; see *Reply Comments on "Orphan Works" Inquiry, Sent by Profs. Jane C. Ginsburg and Paul Goldstein to Copyright Office Notice of Inquiry* 10 (May 9, 2005), <http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/comments/reply/OWR0107-Ginsburg-Goldstein.pdf>; RIDA, *supra* note 110.

b) Databases of Copyrighted Works

True mass digitization, by contrast, can confront the large-scale user with the typical transaction costs conundrum: even where a diligent (or even not-so-diligent) search could locate the rightsholder, the cost of clearing rights can exceed the benefit of being able to use the work. But these costs should not be overstated. The problem is primarily transitional; for works currently in commerce or disseminated with some form of copyright management information, rightsholders can be found and their terms and conditions known. (Actually having to pay known rightsholders, albeit a “transaction cost,” is not one that should excuse a commercial actor-user.¹¹³)

As to in-copyright, out-of-commerce works (some of which may be “orphans”), the Google Book scanning controversy raises a variety of issues. With the rejection of the class action settlement that would have allowed display of substantial portions of the books’ text,¹¹⁴ Google’s program and concomitant fair use defenses shrank to providing bibliographic information and displays of “snippets” (2–3 lines) of text in response to user search queries, as well as access to the database of scanned books for purposes of data mining. Google still retains the scanned full text of millions of in-copyright books, but the “output” its users encounter either eschews copyrightable expression or consists of very short extracts. Google had also sought to bolster its fair use argument by invoking a variant of the transaction-costs problem. In this instance, “diligent search” costs were not involved: Google made no pretense of endeavoring to find rightsholders of out-of-commerce books. Rather, it urged that the sheer number of rightsholders implicated by the mass digitization made *ex ante* rights clearance unduly onerous. Accordingly, Google contended that the burden should be on the rightsholders to object to Google’s use, not on Google to obtain their accord. And in what some might consider adding insult to injury, Google contended that its program should be deemed a fair use because rightsholders had the opportunity to “opt out.”¹¹⁵

Arguably, the “opt out” feature was a diversion (albeit a portentous one for the future conceptualization of copyright), and in any event seems to have dropped out of the litigation by the time Judge Chin issued his opinion on November 14, 2013. The relevant question should have been whether to

113. This proposition may need to be qualified with regard to non-commercial actors: the *Georgia State* case suggests that failure to provide a reasonably priced license could make the copyright owner vulnerable to a successful fair use defense.

114. See *Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc.*, 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

115. For a discussion of the Google Books controversy, see James Grimmelmann, THE PUBLIC INDEX, <http://www.thepublicindex.org/>.

focus exclusively on the probably non-infringing outputs, or to concentrate on the creation and maintenance of a massive full-text commercial database. The Southern District of New York's *HathiTrust* decision was an encouraging precedent for the former approach; although unlike the library consortium, Google is not an eleemosynary institution, and it is not apparent that it requires a social subsidy of the sort that benefits nonprofit libraries. Nonetheless, there is a powerful argument that exploiting a work for its non-expressive information (bibliographic or bean-counting—how many times and in what works a given word or phrase appears) should not even be *prima-facie* infringing, and the creation of a database that enables non-expressive, but progress-of-knowledge-enhancing, outputs must be equally free. But this proves too much: under U.S. law, a library, including a commercial library, is fully entitled to lend the books it owns; the first sale doctrine precludes any copyright claim.¹¹⁶ But the library is not entitled to acquire the lending copies without paying for them (or receiving them as a gift). What Google does, or enables others to do, with the outputs may not be infringing, but those uses should not have obscured the inputs.¹¹⁷

Judge Chin, however, focused almost exclusively on the outputs, effectively bootstrapping the inputs in one sentence: “as one of the keys to Google Books is its offering of full-text search of books, full-work reproduction is critical to the functioning of Google Books.” That functioning Judge Chin celebrated as “highly transformative,” thus following the now-rampant use of the term to bless uses of entire works in the perceived public interest.¹¹⁸

The use of book text to facilitate search through the display of snippets is transformative. . . . Google Books thus uses words for a different purpose—it uses snippets of text to act as pointers directing users to a broad selection of books. Similarly, Google Books is also transformative in the sense that it has transformed book text into data for purposes of substantive research, including data mining and text mining in new areas, thereby opening up new

116. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012) (owner of lawfully made copy may resell or lend that particular copy).

117. *HathiTrust*'s reliance on the “intermediate copying” ground for fair use is not fully persuasive, even for non-commercial entities. Three salient differences with intermediate copying fair use cases such as *Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Acclaim, Inc.*, 977 F.2d 1510, 1522–28 (9th Cir. 1992): the copies there were generated as a necessary part of the copyist's creation of a new and independent work; the copyist did not retain the copy; and the information needed to create the new work could not be ascertained in other ways.

118. But see the Second Circuit's mild corrective in *Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust*, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014).

fields of research. Words in books are being used in a way they have not been used before.

Google Books has created something new in the use of book text—the frequency of words and trends in their usage provide substantive information.

Google Books does not supersede or supplant books because it is not a tool to be used to read books. Instead, it “adds value to the original” and allows for “the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.¹¹⁹

On the question of the impact of Google’s copying on the potential market for plaintiffs’ books, Judge Chin, perhaps surprisingly, embraced the long-spurned argument that defendant’s copying does the plaintiff a favor by bringing the work to greater public attention.¹²⁰

[A] reasonable factfinder could only find that Google Books enhances the sales of books to the benefit of copyright holders. An important factor in the success of an individual title is whether it is discovered—whether potential readers learn of its existence. Google Books provides a way for authors’ works to become noticed, much like traditional in-store book displays. Indeed, both librarians and their patrons use Google Books to identify books to purchase. Many authors have noted that online browsing in general and Google Books in particular helps readers find their work, thus increasing their audiences. Further, Google provides convenient links to booksellers to make it easy for a reader to order a book. In this day and age of on-line shopping, there can be no doubt but that Google Books improves books sales.¹²¹

Both district courts, in *HathiTrust* and *Google Books*, adopted the premise that a rejection of the fair use defense will deprive the public of the benefits of the defendant’s program. But, does it follow that if the inputs are infringing, the generation of non-infringing outputs must be “terminated” unless the inputs are licensed? In a post-*eBay*¹²² remedial landscape, it is not at all clear that a court would award injunctive relief, particularly if it estimated the measure of damages as the price of one copy of each book (for works unregistered before the infringement) or at the low end of statutory damages (\$750 per book for works registered pre-infringement).¹²³ We will consider in

119. *Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc.*, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).

120. On courts’ previous failure to find this contention persuasive, see, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, *Toward a Fair Use Standard*, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990).

121. *Authors Guild, Inc.*, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 293.

122. *eBay v. MercExchange*, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).

123. 17 U.S.C. §§ 412, 504(c)(1) (2012).

Part III whether, as a consequence of possible new-found judicial reluctance to order injunctive relief, the proposed permitted-but-paid regime for certain redistributive uses may already be evolving, particularly in failed fair use cases.

c) Search Engines

This subsection considers a trio of decisions from California involving mass copying of digitized images for inclusion in an image search engine and thumbnail displays in response to search queries.¹²⁴ The transaction cost problems did not go to finding the right owner, whose locatable website the search engine will have “crawled,” but concerned the sheer volume of works. The announced grounds of decision, however, have concentrated on the public benefit and lack of economic impact of a “transformative use.”¹²⁵ Because the purpose of the copying was transformative in that the purpose of the original photo was “aesthetic,” while the search engine use was “informational,” the search engine use did not substitute for the author’s use (though following the search engine’s links could take one to clearly substitutional pirate sites¹²⁶). The rightowner had contended that the thumbnail images displayed by the search engine competed with the emerging market for downloading thumbnails to cellphones, but in *Perfect 10 v. Amazon* the Ninth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff had failed to prove that such a market was truly in prospect.¹²⁷ Reminded that fair use is an affirmative defense, and that the search engine bore the burden of showing that its thumbnails did not compromise that market, the court amended its opinion, but not the result,¹²⁸ which suggests that the burden of proof did not matter because the court had already determined the outcome: the public benefit search engines offer required that the use be fair (and therefore unpaid) one way or another.

124. *Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); *Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.*, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003); *Perfect 10, Inc. v. Yandex*, No. C 12-01521 WHA, 2013 WL 1899851 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2013).

125. The *Perfect 10* court also characterized the index as a “work.” *Perfect 10 Inc. v. Amazon, Inc.*, 508 F.3d at 1165 (“[A] search engine provides social benefit by incorporating an original work into a new work, namely, an electronic reference tool.”)

126. See, e.g., *id.* at 1154 (Google provided links to third-party websites that display infringing full-size versions of Perfect 10’s images).

127. *Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 487 F.3d 701, 725 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We note that Perfect 10 has the burden of proving that it would defeat Google’s affirmative fair use defense”).

128. *Perfect 10 v. Amazon*, 508 F.3d at 1146 (noting amendment of decision on December 3, 2007).

III. COMPARATIVE LAW: EUROPEAN UNION, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND

The United States is an outlier in the broader international landscape of copyright exceptions. Neither the copyright laws of European Union member states, nor of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, include an all-purpose fair use defense (though one has been proposed in Australia), but all these States have enacted a panoply of copyright exceptions, many of which require remuneration. Thus, while our fair use doctrine confronts courts with an all-or-nothing choice, other countries have charted middle courses between barring the use and permitting its unremunerated pursuit. Some of these measures correspond to specific compulsory licensees in U.S. law (for example, for cable retransmission).¹²⁹ Others, however, cover some of my proposed zone of permitted-but-paid uses. The various schemes range from compulsory licenses with government rate-setting to “license it or lose it” schemes in which an unremunerated exception will apply if the copyright owner fails to offer a license. In the latter instance, the license will generally cover a substantial number of works, and the licensor will generally represent a collective of authors and publishers.

But, even with arm-twisting, licensing will work only to the extent that the licensor has the rights to license. In the case of mass uses of works (as the Google Books controversy has shown in the United States) there may be no reasonably compassable number of rightsholder representatives, particularly where copyright owners have not authorized a representative. The European Nordic countries have addressed this transaction-cost problem by imposing an “extended collective license” regime, in which the works of unrepresented rightsholders will be brought within the collective management society’s licensing authority once the society has attained a (legislatively specified) critical mass of rightsholders. More recently, the French legislature in 2012 devised a Google-esque solution to mass book-scanning, by combining an opt-out regime with collective licensing of the digital rights of the remaining books designated by the national library for scanning and republication. Collective management of the grant or administration of the licenses ensures that the authors (and not merely the publishers or other distribution intermediaries) will receive a share of the licensing revenue.

129. See, e.g., *Copyright Act 1968* (Cth) 135 (as amended) (Austl.); Copyright Act R.S.C. 2012, c.C-42, art. 31 (Can.); Consolidated Act on Copyright § 35 (2010) (Den.); Copyright and Related Rights Act 2000 (as amended) (Act. No. 28/2000) § 175 (Ir.); Section 88 of the Copyright Act 1994 (as amended) (N.Z.); Copyright, Designs, Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 73 (as amended) (U.K.).

Finally, with respect to “orphan works” whose rightsholders cannot be found despite a diligent search, the European Union and Canada authorize certain uses by certain classes of users; in Canada, permission may be obtained through a designated licensing authority. These regimes have also addressed the compensation due to those rightsholders who subsequently reappear. This section of the article will summarize current regimes and pending law-reform measures abroad that might inspire a permitted-but-paid regime in the United States.

The regimes may be divided as follows: 1. License it or lose it; 2. Use permitted; remuneration required; 3. French Law on “Unavailable Books”; 4. Orphan works.

A. LICENSE IT OR LOSE IT

“License it or lose it” offers one response to the transaction costs problem of large-scale use of copyrighted works. The use in question will fall under a statutorily specified unremunerated exception unless there is a collective license in place for the use and, usually, if the user was reasonably aware of the licensing scheme. In effect, it places the burden on the copyright owners to organize collective licensing of certain uses by making them uncompensated otherwise. The United Kingdom and New Zealand currently follow this approach in certain contexts, and some have been proposed for Australia. In the existing schemes and in the proposed scheme, these exceptions are explicitly enumerated in the statute and noted to be unremunerated only in the absence of a licensing scheme. Some of the exceptions, particularly for cable retransmissions and for certain uses for the benefit of the visually impaired, address uses which are currently the subject of compulsory licensing or an outright exemption in the United States.¹³⁰

In the United Kingdom, the scheme includes the following uses:¹³⁰

- 1) recording certain broadcasts or copies of broadcasts for placement in nonprofit archives; educational establishments recording broadcast or copies of broadcasts for non-commercial educational purposes;
- 2) specially designated bodies making copies of broadcasts for deaf, hard of hearing, and handicapped with subtitled modifications as needed; and
- 3) making copies and published editions for personal use of visually impaired, including Braille editions and spoken word recordings.

130. Copyright, Designs, Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, §§ 31, 35, 74 (as amended) (U.K.).

New Zealand:¹³¹

- 1) copying sound recording for instruction or relating to learning a language by correspondence and copying done by person giving or receiving lesson and no charge is made for supplying copy;
- 2) copying and communication of a “communication work”¹³² made or communicated by or on behalf of or made and supplied by an educational resource supplier for an educational purpose;
- 3) official archives playing or showing films or sound recordings so long as payment to view/hear no more than a reasonable contribution toward maintenance of archive;
- 4) media monitors recording or transcribing communication work that consists wholly or substantially of news reports or discussions of current events if conditions met (parties negotiate or government sets rate but this does not apply if there is a licensing scheme in place); and
- 5) cable retransmission of communication works.

The proposed changes to Australia’s copyright legislation¹³³ include replacement of certain statutory licenses with either negotiated licenses or a newly introduced, U.S.-inspired unpaid fair use exception. Existing statutory licensing schemes currently in place for governments, educational institutions, and institutions assisting persons with a print disability would all be repealed. Under the proposed new scheme, these licenses should be negotiated voluntarily. However, institutions would not need to negotiate licenses for uses that the parties or the courts considered to be fair use.

B. USE PERMITTED; REMUNERATION REQUIRED

Here, an author may not prohibit specific enumerated uses, but she is entitled to equitable remuneration for these uses. In most instances, a collecting society is responsible for collecting and distributing remuneration and often is the only party who may assert a claim. The key issue, of course, is how the remuneration is set. National legislation discloses three variants on the theme: 1) private parties (usually collecting societies) voluntarily set the remuneration rate; 2) private parties set the remuneration rate but the

131. Sections 44, 48, 57, 88, and 91 of the Copyright Act 1994 (as amended) (N.Z.).

132. A “communication work” includes “radio and TV broadcasts and Internet transmissions, separate from the films, music and other material which they contain.” *An introduction to copyright in New Zealand*, COPYRIGHT COUNCIL OF NEW ZEALAND 2 (Jan. 2009), <http://www.copyright.org.nz/viewInfosheet.php?sheet=29>.

133. Australian Law Reform Commission [ALRC], *Copyright and the Digital Economy*, in ALRC REPORT 122 (Feb. 13, 2014) [hereinafter ALRC Report].

government steps in to determine the rate when the private parties can't agree; and 3) government requires users to obtain licenses from collecting societies. The following is not exhaustive: it covers only some European Union member states and lists only those exceptions that do not correspond to a compulsory license already present in U.S. law.¹³⁴ Cumulatively, the categories suggest the kinds of uses that might populate a U.S. permitted-but-paid regime.

1. Private Parties Set Remuneration Rate

Austria:

In Austria, the author is entitled to equitable remuneration that may only be asserted by a collecting society for the following uses:¹³⁵

- 1) reproducing and distributing published individual literary works to extent justified by purpose (e.g., churches, schools) and also broadcasts designated to be school broadcasts;
- 2) reproducing and distributing individual published works which by nature and designation are intended for use in schools or teaching;
- 3) libraries using video or audio media for public recitation, performance, or presentation of works for no more than two visitors at a time and not for profit;
- 4) schools and higher educational establishments publicly performing cinematographic works for purposes of teaching to extent justified (but does not apply to works intended for teaching); and
- 5) accommodation enterprises publicly showing cinematographic works to guests provided that more than two years have elapsed since work's first performance, performance carried out with aid of permitted audio or video medium, and spectators admitted free of charge.

Finland:¹³⁶

In Finland, the author has a right to remuneration for the following uses:

- 1) reproducing published works by means other than sound and moving images for those who cannot use the works in the ordinary manner

134. I do not here address private copying levies.

135. URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ [COPYRIGHT ACT] BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL] No. 58/2010, §§ 45, 51, 54(1)(3), 56(b)–(c) (Austria).

136. Copyright Act §§ 17–18 (1961) (as amended) (Fin.).

due to disability or illness (but government issues decree on which institutions are entitled to make copies to lend, sell, or use); and

- 2) reproducing minor parts of short published literary or artistic works for use in educational compilation after required years have elapsed since publication (but does not apply to works created for use in education).

Germany:¹³⁷

In Germany, the author is entitled to equitable remuneration, which in most instances may only be asserted by a collecting society, for the following uses:

- 1) reproducing work for non-commercial purposes for exclusive distribution to persons with disabilities if reproduction is necessary for such access;
- 2) reproducing, distributing, and making available published works in non-commercial basic and further training facilities, vocational training facilities, or for church use (but must communicate intent to author or rights holder);
- 3) reproducing, distributing, and communicating newspaper articles and broadcast commentaries and connected illustrations in newspapers and similar information sheets (but not required if short extracts of several articles or commentaries used for overview);
- 4) publicly performing published work to public if serves non-profit-making purpose of event organizer, participants admitted free of charge, and performers unpaid (but not required to pay for events organized by youth, social welfare, geriatric, or prisoner's welfare); and
- 5) public libraries reproducing and transmitting small parts of published articles by post or fax (but limitations on electronic reproduction).

Lithuania:¹³⁸

In Lithuania, the author is entitled to remuneration through compulsory licenses that are administered and distributed by the appropriate collecting society for the following uses:

137. Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG] [Copyright Act], July 16, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBl], as amended, §§ 45(a), 46, 49(1), 52, 53(a) (Ger.).

138. Law on Copyrights and Related Rights (as amended) Art. 23 (1999) (Lith.).

- 1) reproducing by reprography for non-commercial purposes published articles or other short work, short extract of writing with or without illustrations; and
- 2) reproducing by reprography for non-commercial purposes work kept in publicly accessible libraries, educational establishments, museums, or archives, except when over the Internet, for purpose of replacement of a lost, destroyed, or unfit-for-use copy in own or other archive or library if impossible to obtain by other means.

Netherlands:¹³⁹

In the Netherlands, the author must be paid equitable remuneration for the following uses:

- 1) libraries and educational institutions making copies of printed works for their library services and for students;
- 2) use for the benefit of people with a disability if the use is non-commercial and related to the disability.

Norway:¹⁴⁰

In Norway, the author is entitled to remuneration for the following uses:

- 1) copying published work for educational purposes for use in public examinations;
- 2) reproducing collective work for use in religious services or education or minor parts of literary/scientific works or musical works or short works if five years have elapsed since the expiry of the year in which the work was published;
- 3) reproducing published works of art and photos in connection with the text of a critical or scientific treatise which is not of a generally informative character (limitation is not applicable to photographs) in accordance with proper usage and to extent necessary to achieve desired purpose; and
- 4) reproducing published works of art and photos in newspapers, periodicals, and broadcasts in connection with reporting a current event (but does not apply if the current event is related to the work that is reproduced).

139. Wet van 23 september 1912, houdende nieuwe regeling van het auteursrecht [Act of Sept. 23, 1912, Containing New Regulation for Copyright], Stb. (as amended) Arts. 16h, 15j, 26a (Neth.).

140. Copyright Act (as amended) §§ 13(a), 18, 23, 23(a) (1961) (Nor.).

Poland:¹⁴¹

In Poland, the author must be paid remuneration for the following uses:

- 1) including excerpts from larger works or entire small works in textbooks and in anthologies that are collections of excerpts for scientific or educational purposes;
- 2) centers for scientific and technical information distributing single copies of excerpts from published works; and
- 3) reproducing published works of fine art in encyclopedias and atlases when attempts to contact copyright owners for permission encounter serious obstacles.

Spain:¹⁴²

In Spain, the author is entitled to equitable remuneration for the following use:

- 1) reproducing, distributing, and communicating works disseminated in mass-media studies and articles on current events (unless rights expressly reserved).

Sweden:¹⁴³

In Sweden, the author must be paid equitable remuneration for the following uses:

- 1) using by and for the disabled beyond specifically exempted thresholds; and
 - 2) distributing more than a few copies or communicating or distributing copies and recordings that disabled persons can retain.
- a) Private Parties Set Remuneration Rate; Copyright Tribunals Set Rate If Parties Cannot Agree

141. Act on Copyright and Related Rights (as amended) Arts. 29.2, 30.2, 33.3 (1994) (Pol.).

142. Revised Law on Intellectual Property Art. 33.1 (R.D.L. 1996, 1) (as amended) (Spain).

143. 17 ch. LAG OM UPPHOVSRÄTT TILL LITTERÄRA OCH KONSTNÄRLIGA VERK (Svensk förfatningssamling [SFS] 1960:729) (as amended) (Swed.).

Australia:¹⁴⁴

In Australia, the Copyright Tribunal sets the rate if private parties cannot agree on a rate for the following uses:

- 1) reproducing articles or reasonable portion of published or unpublished works in electronic form by educational institutions, including visual art alongside text;
- 2) reproducing published literary and dramatic works for the research, study or instruction of a person with a print disability, including in electronic form;
- 3) copying to assist persons with intellectual disabilities if material is not commercially available; print disability license holders broadcasting published literary and dramatic works and adaptations;
- 4) qualifying institution copying a broadcast, or any work, sound recording, or film in a transmission for education for the disabled;
- 5) performing sound recordings in places open to the public.

Denmark:¹⁴⁵

In Denmark, the Copyright License Tribunal sets the rate if private parties cannot agree on a rate for the following uses:

- 1) use of published sound recordings in broadcasts on radio and television and other public performances (but excluding on-demand Internet transmission);
- 2) non-commercial use and distribution of copies of published works specifically intended for the blind, visually impaired, deaf, and sufferers of speech impediments, including sound recordings of literary works for visually impaired (but no other sound recordings of literary or musical works); and
- 3) use of minor portions of literary and musical works or such works of small proportions and works of art in connection with the text in composite works compiling contributions by a large number of authors for use in educational activities provided that five years have elapsed since the work was published.

Italy:¹⁴⁶

144. *Copyright Act 1968* (Cth) §§ 108, 135 (as amended) (Austl.)

145. Consolidated Act on Copyright §§ 17(1)–(3), 18 (2010), 68 (Den.).

146. Legge 22 aprile 1941, n. 633, Arts. 46(3), 58, 51–59, 70(2), 60 (It.).

In Italy, the rate is set based on criteria set out by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers if private parties cannot agree on a rate for the following use:

- 1) reproducing protected works in anthologies for educational use.

New Zealand:¹⁴⁷

In New Zealand, the Copyright Tribunal sets the rate if private parties cannot agree on a rate for the following use:

- 1) librarian making copies of published editions for collections of other libraries.

Sweden:¹⁴⁸

In Sweden, the court sets the rate if private parties cannot agree on a rate for the following use:

- 1) reproducing protected materials in compilations made and used for educational purposes.

When the parties cannot agree, the state may resolve the rate through national Copyright Boards or Tribunals. Generally speaking, Copyright Tribunals seem to play the largest role in Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Canada. In most instances, however, this role remains fairly minor. In Australia, for example, parties generally agree on a rate amongst themselves and so the Copyright Tribunal hears only approximately two matters per year.¹⁴⁹ Similarly in New Zealand, collecting societies set rates and the Tribunal steps in only when the collecting society rate is challenged. These challenges often result in interparty settlements and the Tribunal issues a rate only if the matter goes to a full hearing, which rarely occurs.¹⁵⁰ In the

147. The Copyright Act of 1994, §§ 54, 63 (as amended) (N.Z.).

148. 18 ch. LAG OM UPPHOVRÄTT TILL LITTERÄRA OCH KONSTNÄRLIGA VERK (Svensk författningsamling [SFS] 1960:729) (Swed.).

149. Email correspondence with Paddy Hannigan, Deputy District Registrar, Australian Copyright Tribunal to Olena Ripnick, research assistant to Jane Ginsburg (Feb. 9, 2014, 9:27 PM GMT/4:27 PM EST) (on file with author).

150. Email from Prof. Susy Frankel, President, N.Z. Copyright Tribunal, to Olena Ripnick, research assistant to Jane Ginsburg (Mar. 3, 2014, 1:26 PM GMT/8:26 AM EST) (on file with author).

United Kingdom, the Copyright Tribunal primarily confirms rates that private parties have agreed upon themselves.¹⁵¹

The Copyright Board plays the largest role in rate setting in Canada, as certain collecting societies are required by law to set tariffs for certain uses. Here, the collecting society publishes the tariff and parties are given a chance to object. If a party does not object, the tariff is confirmed. If a party does object, the Copyright Board proceeds to a hearing, but during this process parties frequently negotiate and agree on a rate amongst themselves and then ask the Copyright Board to certify that rate six to twelve months later before the matter goes to a full hearing. The Copyright Board sets the rate only when the parties cannot come to an agreement amongst themselves. For uses that are not required by law to have a tariff, parties generally negotiate amongst themselves and may file the rate with the Copyright Board but are not required to do so. On rare occasion, the Copyright Board may be asked to act as an arbiter or set a tariff with regard to these uses.¹⁵²

2. Government Requires License from Collecting Society—Extended Collective Licensing¹⁵³

Since the early 1960s, the Nordic countries have facilitated the large-scale licensing of works, generally for public purposes, by legislation that brings works unrepresented by the relevant collecting society within the licensing authority of that society. Some, but not all, of the statutory provisions allow rightsholders to opt out of the collective license. Extended collective licenses (“ECL”) have received considerable attention lately as a possible solution to the orphan-works and mass-digitization problems.¹⁵⁴ Scholars from the Nordic countries, however, have expressed skepticism that the approach can be generalized to nations lacking the Nordic countries’ particular traditions of social organization.¹⁵⁵ Nonetheless, I summarize the laws’ coverage in order

151. Email from Catherine Worley, U.K. Copyright Tribunal, to Olena Ripnick, research assistant to Jane Ginsburg (Feb. 10, 2014 10:49 AM GMT/5:49 AM EST) (on file with author).

152. Telephone Interview with Dr. Raphael Solomon, Director, Research & Analysis, Copyright Board Canada (Mar. 3, 2014).

153. See generally Gunnar Karnell, *Extended Collective License Clauses and Agreements in Nordic Copyright Law*, 10 COLUM J. L. & ARTS 73 (1985); Thomas Riis & Jens Schovsbo, *Extended Collective Licenses and the Nordic Experience: It's a Hybrid but is it a Volvo or a Lemon?*, 33 COLUM J. L. & ARTS 471 (2010).

154. See generally Katharina de la Durantaye, *Finding a Home for Orphans: Google Book Search and Orphan Works Law in the United States and Europe*, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 229 (2011); David R. Hansen et al., *Solving the Orphan Works Problem for the United States*, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2013).

155. See Riis & Schovsbo, *supra* note 153, at 495–96.

to give an idea of the kinds of uses these legislatures have determined should be permitted-but-paid.

ECL uses fall into a number of similar categories. They are as follows:

- 1) educational uses;¹⁵⁶
- 2) library and archive uses;¹⁵⁷
- 3) internal uses in public and/or private organizations;¹⁵⁸
- 4) broadcasting published works;¹⁵⁹

156. Consolidated Act on Copyright § 13 (2010) (Den.) (copying published works and recording works broadcast on radio and TV as well as own performance for educational uses, but does not apply to computer programs or more than brief extracts from cinematographic works); Copyright Act § 14 (1961) (as amended) (Fin.) (reproducing, making public and performing works for educational activities and scientific research); Copyright Act (as amended) § 13(b) (1961) (Nor.) (copying published works and broadcasts for educational activities, but does not apply to broadcasts that consist of more than minor parts of cinematographic work); 42c ch. LAG OM UPPHOVSRÄTT TILL LITTERÄRA OCH KONSTNÄRLIGA VERK (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 1960:729) (as amended) (Swed.) (copying works that have been made public for educational purposes).

157. Consolidated Act on Copyright § 16(b) (2010) (Den.) (public libraries digitally reproducing articles from newspapers, magazines, composite works, brief excerpts from published literary works and illustrations and music reproduced in connection with the text (but does not permit broadcast by radio or TV or the making available to the public of works in such a way that the public may access them at the place and time of their choosing); Copyright Act § 16(d) (1961) (as amended) (Fin.) (archives, public libraries, museums reproducing and communicating works for purposes not included in unremunerated exceptions); Copyright Act (as amended) § 16(a) (1961) (Nor.) (libraries, archives, museums copying and making available published works in their collections); 42d ch. LAG OM UPPHOVSRÄTT TILL LITTERÄRA OCH KONSTNÄRLIGA VERK (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 1960:729) (as amended) (Swed.) (libraries and archives communicating single articles and short portions of works to library borrowers (but does not apply to computer programs) and distributing copies of works prepared pursuant to library exception for purposes not included in unremunerated exceptions).

158. Consolidated Act on Copyright § 14 (2010) (Den.) (public or private institutions, organizations and businesses copying articles, brief excerpts of descriptive published works or musical works and illustrations for internal use to advance their own activities); Copyright Act § 13(a) (1961) (as amended) (Fin.) (reproducing published article and accompanying illustration for internal communication); Copyright Act § 14 (as amended) (1961) (Nor.) (public and private institutions and organizations and commercial enterprises copying published works and broadcasts for use within their own activities (but does not apply to broadcasts that consist of more than minor parts of cinematographic work)); 42b ch. LAG OM UPPHOVSRÄTT TILL LITTERÄRA OCH KONSTNÄRLIGA VERK (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 1960:729) (as amended) (Swed.) (decision-making municipal assemblies, governmental and municipal authorities, enterprises, and organizations copying published literary works and works of fine art published in connection with the text by means of reprographic reproduction in order to satisfy the need for information within their field of activities).

159. Consolidated Act on Copyright § 30 (2010) (Den.) (public access television companies broadcasting published works on radio or TV broadcast, but does not apply to satellite unless there is a simultaneous terrestrial broadcast); Copyright Act 1961 (as

- 5) television retransmission;¹⁶⁰
- 6) fixations of broadcast works for the disabled;¹⁶¹
- 7) reproducing published works of art;¹⁶² and
- 8) public access to specified public television programs at a time and place chosen by the viewer.¹⁶³

C. FRENCH LAW ON “UNAVAILABLE BOOKS”

The French legislature in March 2012 unanimously enacted a law on “unavailable books,”¹⁶⁴ which was designed to make the corpus of out-of-

amended) § 25(f)–(g) (Fin.) (broadcasting organization transmitting a work, copying a work for up to a year to use in its own broadcast for a maximum of four times per year—and potentially longer/more depending on terms of ECL—broadcasting organization transmitting a new work made public if included in a TV program produced by the broadcasting organization and transmitted before January 1, 1985); Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) § 30 (Nor.) (broadcast organizations named by King broadcasting published work); 42e ch. LAG OM UPPHOVSRÄTT TILL LITTERÄRA OCH KONSTNÄRLIGA VERK (Svensk förfatningssamling [SFS] 1960:729) (as amended) (Swed.) (sound radio and television organizations specified by government broadcasting public literary, musical, and fine art works, but does not apply to works made for the stage and only applies to transmissions via satellite if the broadcasting organization simultaneously carries out a broadcast through a terrestrial transmitter).

160. Consolidated Act on Copyright § 35 (2010) (Den.) (simultaneous retransmission on cable of works broadcast wirelessly on radio or television); Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) § 25(4) (Fin.) (retransmitting work included in radio or TV transmission for reception by the public simultaneously with the original transmission); Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) § 34 (Nor.) (broadcast organizations using works that are lawfully included in a broadcast and communicating to public by simultaneous and unaltered retransmission); 42f ch. LAG OM UPPHOVSRÄTT TILL LITTERÄRA OCH KONSTNÄRLIGA VERK (Svensk förfatningssamling [SFS] 1960:729) (as amended) (Swed.) (transmitting or retransmitting to public, simultaneously and in unaltered form, by wire or wireless means, works which form part of a wireless sound radio or TV broadcast).

161. Consolidated Act on Copyright § 17(4) (2010) (Den.) (government, municipal, and other social nonprofit institutions reproducing sound or visual recordings broadcast on TV or radio in a manner accessible to visually handicapped and hearing-impaired people by means of sound or visual recordings); Copyright Act (as amended) § 17(b) (1961) (Nor.) (producing and using fixations for the disabled (and King may issue regulations regarding right to make a fixation of published film or picture with or without sound not essentially consisting of musical works)).

162. Consolidated Act on Copyright § 24(a) (2010) (Den.) (reproducing published works of art); Copyright Act 1961 (as amended) § 25(a)(2) (Fin.) (reproducing work of art in collection or sale for purposes other than promoting the exhibition or sale).

163. Consolidated Act on Copyright § 30(a) (2010) (Den.) (public access to state-owned television company productions at places and times selected by the viewer); Copyright Act (as amended) § 32 (1961) (Nor.) (specific broadcasting organizations using issued works in their collections and in connection with new broadcasts and transmissions in such a way that individuals can choose time and place of access to the work (only applies to works broadcast before January 1, 1997 that are part of broadcaster’s own productions and author may prohibit use)).

print French books digitally available (and to offer a national alternative to Google Books, whose scanning program the Paris trial court had, not coincidentally, condemned as copyright infringement¹⁶⁵). The law directs the Bibliothèque nationale de France to establish a database of all works published in France before 2001 that are not available in print or digital forms. The creation of the list of works derives from comparing the national library's holdings with databases of commercially available books, but also includes a crowd-sourcing component. Every year, the national library will generate a new list.

The law vests management of the digital rights in a collecting society, whose board is composed of equal numbers of authors and publishers. Once the book is listed, authors and publishers have six months to oppose the collecting society's management of the book. After six months, the author may nonetheless oppose on the basis of harm to her honor or reputation. If the publisher opposes, it has two years to exploit the book; the author incurs no corresponding obligation. Thereafter, the collecting society is empowered to exercise its right to authorize the reproduction and communication of the book in digital form, by offering five-year renewable non-exclusive licenses, subject to remuneration, to digitize and disseminate. The law, however, does not detail how the remuneration will be calculated, other than to require that it be "equitably" distributed between authors and publishers, and that the author's share may not be less than the publisher's.¹⁶⁶

Absent opposition, the collecting society must first offer the original print publisher a ten-year automatically renewable exclusive license to reproduce and make the work available in digital form. The publisher has two months to respond, and, if it exercises this right of first refusal, it has three years to make the book available. If the publisher does not exercise the right, or fails to publish digitally within three years, the collecting society will offer non-exclusive digitization and dissemination licenses to all comers. The author may oppose the grant of the exclusive license to the original print

164. Loi 2012-287 du 1 mars 2012 relative à l'exploitation numérique des livres indisponibles du XXe siècle [Law 2012-287 of Mar. 1, 2012 on the Digital Exploitation of Unavailable Books of the Twentieth Century], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Mar. 2, 2012 , p. 3986 (effective as of the publication of décret n°2013-182 of Feb. 27, 2013 on the application of articles L.134-1 à L.134-9 of the Code of intellectual property). The French Constitutional Council recently rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of this law. *See* Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 213-370 QPC, Feb. 28, 2014 (Fr.).

165. Tribunal de grande instance [ordinary court of original jurisdiction], Paris, 3e ch., Dec. 18, 2009 (Fr.), available at http://www.legalis.net/?page=jurisprudence-decision&id_article=2812.

166. CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE [C.P.I.] art. L.134-3 II cl. 5 et seq. (Fr.)

publisher if the author proves that the publisher did not acquire digital rights. The author may at any time withdraw the collecting society's power to grant non-exclusive digitization licenses if the author proves that he or she alone held digitization rights. And authors and publishers may at any time jointly withdraw the collecting society's power, but the publisher must exploit the book within eighteen months. Any licenses the collecting society may already have granted will continue in force for any remainder of the five-year period covered by the grant.

In the case of so-called orphan books, the French law empowers the collecting society to authorize publicly accessible libraries to digitize and disseminate books in their collections, if after ten years from the inclusion of the book in the collecting society's repertoire, the copyright holders have not been found notwithstanding a diligent search. Libraries pay no remuneration to the collecting society, but they must not derive any economic or commercial benefit from digitizing and making the books available to the public.¹⁶⁷

A few observations: first, the law does not create a free national digital lending library. With the exception of orphan books, the law does not enable libraries freely to digitize and disseminate out-of-print books. Libraries could acquire non-exclusive licenses to do so, but the licenses must be paid for. On the other hand, the cost of those licenses may well be considerably less than the cost of negotiating rights from the copyright owners. It remains to be seen whether libraries would undertake the outlay, and, if they did, whether the free availability of digitized out-of-print books from libraries would discourage for-profit publishers from entering the market.

Second, non-exclusive licenses for exercise by libraries or others will be granted only if the publisher does not make the book available. Here, the law's allocation of the respective rights of authors and publishers is problematic, and, for France, surprising. During the first six months following the book's inclusion on the Bibliothèque nationale's database, both authors and publishers may oppose the collecting society's exercise of digitization rights. The objecting publisher, however, will have to exploit the book within two years. But the publisher may not have acquired digital rights, or the contract may be ambiguous as to the acquisition of rights over new modes of exploitation. So, without making a deal with the author, the publisher may not be in a position to oppose the collecting society's

167. *Id.* at L. 134-8, cl. 2 ("L'autorisation mentionnée au premier alinéa est délivrée sous réserve que l'institution bénéficiaire ne recherche aucun avantage économique ou commercial. [The license mentioned in the first clause is subject to the beneficiary institution not seeking any economic or commercial advantage.]").

administration of digital rights. On the other hand, if the publisher does not oppose, the collecting society administers the rights but must first offer them, on an exclusive basis, to the publisher who holds the print rights. In other words, the law gives to the publishers what they may not have received by contract. Ambiguity in the contract now favors the publisher. In a reversal of the usual burden of proof regarding the scope of the author's grant of rights, the law requires the author to demonstrate that she retained the rights, rather than obliging the publisher to prove their acquisition. So why should the publisher bother negotiating with the author for digital rights if the publisher can get those rights by transfer of law? Arguably, this is expropriation, and worse, the law expropriates authors not for the public benefit of nonprofit libraries, but for the benefit of for-profit publishers. On the other hand, the authors will be paid half the licensing revenue; without the licensing scheme, the author would have derived no revenue from the books that otherwise would have remained out of commerce.

The law has now been in effect long enough for the Bibliothèque nationale to have published an initial list of 60,000 "unavailable" titles.¹⁶⁸ The collecting society designated to administer the electronic rights in those books has received only 2500 oppositions to the listings, mostly from authors or publishers who claim an intention to publish a digital edition.¹⁶⁹ Details concerning who undertakes the digitization, and at whose cost, remain to be worked out, as does the rate-setting for the royalty to be paid to authors. And it is still too early to ascertain how many of the original publishers will take up the collecting society's invitation to prepare a digital edition.

The law, conceived as France's answer to Google,¹⁷⁰ goes a step beyond Nordic-style extended collective licenses because it vests the management

168. FLORENCE-MARIE PIRIOU, LEGICOM, LE LIVRE NUMERIQUE: UNE REVOLUTION JURIDIQUE EN MARCHE? [Legicom Digital Books: a Judicial Revolution Underway?] (2014).

169. Email to Jane Ginsburg from Florence Marie Piriou, Deputy Director of Sofia, the collecting society empowered to administer the licenses for "unavailable books" (Oct. 7, 2013, 10:26 AM) (on file with author).

170. See, e.g., Franck Macrez, *L'exploitation numérique des livres indisponibles : que reste-t-il du droit d'auteur ?* [Digital exploitation of unavailable books: what's left of copyright?], FRANCK MACREZ (Apr. 3, 2012), <http://franck.macrez.net/?p=210> (the solution that was adopted seeks to give new life to a currently neglected corpus, and to respond to the desire for massive digitization inspired by Google); Société nationale de l'édition, *Numérisation des livres indisponibles* [Digitization of unavailable books], SYNDICAT NATIONAL DE L'EDITION (Mar. 1 2012), <http://www.sne.fr/dossiers-et-enjeux/numerique/numerisation-des-livres-indisponibles.html> (genesis of the law was to respond to Google Books' digitization strategy); see also Lionel Maurel, *De la loi sur les indisponibles au registre ReLIRE: la blesure, l'insulte et la réaction en marche* [From the law on unavailable books to the ReLire registry: the injury, the insult, and the unfolding reaction] (Mar. 24, 2013), <http://scinfolex.com/2013/03/24/de-la-loi-sur-les->

authority in a collecting society without requiring the society to demonstrate that it already represents most or even some of the rightsholders. Although the collecting society exercises a “mandate” or “authorization to manage,”¹⁷¹ it is not the rightsholders who delegate this authority (as with conventional collecting societies), but the State that confers it. This in turn implies that the law endows the State with the power to grant digitization licenses in pre-2001 French-published books whose rightowners do not timely object or, having objected, do not timely publish. The law thus also steps well beyond “opt out” in that it not only requires authors and publishers to declare their ownership and their objections in order to retain their rights, but also, at least for the publishers, in fact to exercise those rights, lest they be granted to other publishers, albeit with unspecified remuneration to the original rightsholders. The remuneration feature makes this an attenuated version of “use it or lose it.” It is, for France, a country long wed to a highly “propertarian” concept of copyright,¹⁷² a rather radical reworking. It is also unlikely that the legislature, in its haste to institute a national program of book scanning, thought through the broader implications of vesting the State with the authority to direct digital exploitations of out of print books (or effectively to transfer the author’s digital rights to the publishers).¹⁷³

However conceptually problematic, the French law does offer another model of permitted-but-paid. One that short circuits the difficulties of assembling rightsholders into a collecting society, or of extending that

indisponibles-a-la-base-relire-la-blessure-linsulte-et-la-reaction-en-marche/ (“Loin d’avoir fait mieux que Google, la France a employé exactement les mêmes procédés douteux que le moteur de recherche, avec les memes conséquences à la clé.” [Far from having done better than Google, France has employed exactly the same dubious procedures as the search engine, with the same consequences.]).

171. Florence Marie Piriou, *Nouveau régime légal des livres indisponibles du XXe siècle* [New legal regime for 20th-century unavailable books] (2013) (unpublished paper) (on file with author) (“Il ne s’agit ni d’une exception ni d’une cession légale de droits mais plutôt d’un mandat légal.” [At issue is neither an exception nor a statutory transfer of rights, but rather a legal mandate (authorization).]).

172. For example, the first article of the copyright section of the *CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE*, art. L. 1-111 (Fr.), declares: “L’auteur d’une oeuvre de l’esprit jouit sur cette oeuvre, du seul fait de sa création, d’un droit de propriété incorporelle exclusif et opposable à tous.” [The author of a work of authorship enjoys in that work, by the sole fact of its creation, an incorporeal and exclusive property right which may be asserted against all.]

173. The French law may also clash with international norms limiting copyright exceptions and limitations. Because these apply only to foreign works, however, the legislature has sought to avoid the problem by limiting the law’s application to works first published in France. To the extent that those works may include translations of foreign authors’ works, the legislation may still be vulnerable to challenge for violation of TRIPs art. 13 (should any foreign government seek to bring such a challenge).

society's authority to represent non-members. And which may produce some revenue for the authors of books now lying fallow. It is also clear that any initiative of this scope would require legislative intervention; private ordering on this scale is not an option.¹⁷⁴

D. ORPHAN WORKS

In 2012, the European Union issued a Directive regarding orphan works to permit public libraries and nonprofit national broadcasters to disseminate works of authors and rightsholders who cannot be located following a diligent search.¹⁷⁵ The Directive does not impose an upfront license fee for use of the work, but requires payment of "fair compensation" to rightowners who reappear and "put an end" to the work's "orphan" status.¹⁷⁶ Because member states have until October 29, 2014 to implement the Directive,¹⁷⁷ only the United Kingdom and Hungary currently present examples of compensation schemes. Canada has long established a licensing program for works whose rightsholders cannot be found.¹⁷⁸

1. European Union

The Directive gives member states considerable leeway in addressing the rights of reappearing rightsholders. Article 6(5) provides that "[m]ember States shall be free to determine the circumstances under which the payment of such compensation may be organized."¹⁷⁹

a) United Kingdom

In 2013 the United Kingdom passed the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, 2013 c. 24, § 77, "licensing of copyright and performers' rights," which adds a new orphan-works provision: sections 116A–116D. The legislation contemplates a licensing regime that may be administered,

174. Cf. *Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc.*, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding the scale of proposed settlement inappropriate to private ordering).

175. Council Directive 2012/28, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 Oct. 2012 on Certain Permitted Uses of Orphan Works, 2012 O.J. (L 299/5) [hereinafter Council Directive].

176. *Id.* art. 6(5) and recital 18.

177. *Id.* art. 9(1).

178. The Canadian Copyright Board issued its first decision in this regard in 1990. MacLean Hunter Ltd., Copyright Board Can., File 1990–3 (Aug. 24, 1990), available at <http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/unlocatable-introuvables/licences/1-b.pdf>.

179. The same article states that the level of compensation will be determined by the law of the member state whose public institution made the use; by contrast, a work's "orphan" status is determined according to the law of the work's country of origin. See Council Directive art. 3(3).

pursuant to regulations, by a state authority and/or through extended collective licensing. The scheme appears to anticipate that the license fees will be paid in before any missing rightsholder reappears to claim compensation, because the law mandates that regulations provide for the disposition of unclaimed sums paid under the license.¹⁸⁰

b) Hungary

Hungary anticipated the Orphan Works Directive by regulations adopted in 2009.¹⁸¹ Like the United Kingdom, Hungary has also based its orphan works regime on upfront licensing, but the sole entity empowered to grant licenses appears to be the Hungarian Patent Office (“HPO”). The HPO also rules on the withdrawal of licenses in the event the author becomes known; the HPO will also determine the extent of the remuneration due to the author.¹⁸²

2. Canada

Canada’s orphan works provisions set out a regime for all potential uses of orphan works. Section 77 of the Copyright Act permits the Copyright Board of Canada (“CBC”) to issue a non-exclusive license (subject to any terms the Board establishes) for use in Canada to a user whose reasonable efforts to locate a copyright owner have been unsuccessful. Section 77 applies to a published work, to a fixation of a performer’s performance, published sound recording, or a fixation of a communication signal in which copyright subsists. The CBC may grant a non-exclusive license to engage in a broad range of acts.¹⁸³

The CBC will grant a license only if the user can show that he or she made every reasonable effort to find the copyright owner. There is no definition of “reasonable effort” in section 77 and no formal standards have been established by CBC regulation to date (though the legislation permits the CBC to create the standard). Licensing decisions usually issue within thirty to forty-five days. In setting the license fee, the CBC generally bases the rate on what the collecting society that would normally represent the

180. See *id.* § 116C(4) (“The regulations must provide for the treatment of any royalties or other sums paid in respect of a license, including . . . (c) the treatment of sums after that period (as bona vacantia or otherwise.”).

181. 100/2009 (V.8) Korm. rendelet az árva mű egyes felhasználásainak engedélyezésére vonatkozó részletes szabályokról (Government Decree No. 100/2009 (V.8) on the Detailed Rules Related to the Licensing of Certain Use of Orphan Works), arts. 2(1), 2(2), 3 (Hung.), available at http://www.hipo.gov.hu/English/jogforras/100_2009.pdf.

182. *Id.* arts. 7, 8.

183. See Copyright Act R.S.C. 2012, c.C-42, art. 31 (Can.).

rightsholder charges for the type of use in question and then orders that royalties be paid directly to that collecting society (the system assumes that every class of rightsholder will have a corresponding collecting society).¹⁸⁴ Under section 77, the subsequently appearing copyright owner may collect the royalties fixed in the license no later than five years after its expiration. The CBC allows collecting societies to dispose of the royalties as it sees fit for the general benefit of its members, but the society undertakes to reimburse any person who establishes, within five years after the expiry of the license, ownership of the work covered by the license.¹⁸⁵

IV. PROPOSAL FOR U.S. COPYRIGHT REFORM: LEGISLATION IN AID OF PRIVATE ORDERING

A. TO WHAT EXTENT DO WE ALREADY HAVE PERMITTED-BUT-PAID?

If, rather than excusing altogether some socially beneficial or market-failure non-authorship uses of copyrighted works, requiring payment for them would be desirable, how might we achieve that end? In the first place, we should inquire to what extent we already have permitted-but-paid regimes. Some of these exist in the form of statutory compulsory licenses. Others may be emerging as a result of judicial reluctance in the wake of *eBay v. MercExchange* to grant injunctive relief. Fuller examination suggests, however, that the Supreme Court's decision has not lead to a generalized substitution of damage awards (judge-made compulsory licenses) in lieu of injunctions.

1. *Extant Compulsory-License Regimes*

The 1976 U.S. Copyright Act institutes compulsory licenses such as: mechanical licenses for creation of sound recordings of non-dramatic musical compositions for distribution of phonorecords to the public (§ 115); cable and satellite retransmissions (§§ 111, 119, 122); non-interactive digital performances of sound recordings (§114); public broadcasting (§ 118); and

184. Telephone Interview with Dr. Raphael Solomon, Director, Research & Analysis, Copyright Board Canada (Mar. 3, 2014). A list of CBC licenses can be found at *Decisions—Unlocatable Copyright Owners*, COPYRIGHT BOARD OF CANADA, <http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/unlocatable-introuvables/licences-e.html> (last visited Aug. 2, 2014). CBC refusals to grant an unlocatable right owner can be found at <http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/unlocatable-introuvables/denied-refusees-e.html>

185. See *Unlocatable Copyright Owners*, COPYRIGHT BOARD OF CANADA (July 7, 2001), <http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/unlocatable-introuvables/brochure2-e.html>.

jukeboxes (§ 116).¹⁸⁶ The statute also favors negotiated solutions in lieu of administrative rate-setting,¹⁸⁷ and accordingly provides in several instances for antitrust exemptions to enable industry-wide licensing negotiations; the compulsory licenses, in turn, serve as backstops should private ordering fail.¹⁸⁸ Furthermore, the statute creates a Copyright Royalty Board (“CRB”) to set the rates, but a CRB proceeding can be both lengthy and expensive.¹⁸⁹ A recent Copyright Office study acknowledges that

[p]roceedings may involve numerous interested parties and often take two years or longer to complete. The CRB process allows for significant discovery, including document production and depositions, though it is not as broad as discovery permitted under the Federal Rules. Trials before the CRB, relatively formal in nature, typically involve multiple expert and non-expert witnesses and voluminous economic evidence, and can last several weeks.¹⁹⁰

186. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115, 116, 118, 119, 122 (2012).

187. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 803(b)(3) (2012) (three-month voluntary negotiation period following initiation of CRB rate-making proceeding), § 805 (“General rule for voluntarily negotiated agreements”). Of the ratemakings published in the Federal Register (which include those that settle and those that do not), nine have settled prior to the CRB’s final independent determination, while seven have not. (The CRB was created in 2004, and the first final rule promulgated by the CRB was in 2007.)

188. See *id.* §§ 114, 115(c)(3)(B), 116, 118; see also § 115 (describing inter-industry agreement and settlement rates).

189. See *id.* §§ 803, 804 (setting out CRB proceedings in extensive detail). Regarding the cost and duration of CRB proceedings, Music Choice’s written statement alone in one case constituted 1671 pages. See *Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services*, U.S. COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD (Spring 2013), available at <http://www.loc.gov/crb/proceedings/2011-1/>. Sirius XM’s statement in the same proceeding was 1689 pages. Copyright royalty hearings can involve extensive expert testimony as well. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord’s 2009 Delivery Rate Determination Proceeding involved dozens of witnesses’ testimony from three interested parties at initial hearings and as part of rebuttal testimony; see 74 C.F.R. 6832, Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Determination Proceeding; Review of Copyright Royalty Judges Determination; Final Rule and Notice (Feb. 11, 2009), available at <http://www.loc.gov/crb/fedreg/2009/74fr4510.pdf#page=2>. With respect to duration of a ratemaking proceeding, a contested ratemaking takes roughly two years; ratemakings with early settlements usually take less time, often around one year or even less. For the 2011 Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription Services and Satellite Digital Audio Radio Services (section 114 ratesetting for 2013–17), the ratemaking commenced on January 5, 2011 with notice in the Federal Register, and was concluded February 14, 2013.

190. *Copyright Small Claims: A Report of the Register of Copyrights*, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, at *63 (September 2013), <http://www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims/>.

Moreover, since rates may require revision over time, the statute also provides a schedule for revisiting prior rate settings.¹⁹¹ Compulsory licenses have been criticized as excessively cumbersome and insufficiently responsive to technological and market evolutions.¹⁹²

2. *The Effect of eBay: Will Failed Fair Use Defenses Yield Only Monetary Remedies (De Facto Permitted-But-Paid)?*

While statutory compulsory licenses govern only those situations expressly designated by Congress, judge-made compulsory licenses (some even authorized in the Copyright Act¹⁹³) could introduce desirable flexibility more broadly. The Ninth Circuit in *Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of America*, having found the use of the videotape recorder to record off-air television programming to infringe, posited a “continuing royalty” in lieu of an injunction.¹⁹⁴ (How judges would set the rate, and whether undertaking such a task would be desirable, is another matter.¹⁹⁵)

Arguably, the Supreme Court’s ruling in *eBay v. MercExchange*, that irreparable harm should not be presumed upon proof of patent infringement, will chasten judges in all intellectual property infringement cases, and will lead to fewer grants of injunctive relief in copyright infringement cases as well.¹⁹⁶ Withholding injunctive relief would set the stage for inter-party

191. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2) (adjustment of rates for cable retransmissions), § 804(b)(4) (“A petition described in subsection (a) to initiate proceedings under section 801(b)(1) concerning the adjustment or determination of royalty rates as provided in section 115 may be filed in the year 2006 and in each subsequent fifth calendar year, or at such other times as the parties have agreed under section 115(c)(3)(B) and (C)”) (2012).

192. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, *Copyright*, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 84 (1992); Robert P. Merges, *Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property*, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2669 (1994) (speculating that compulsory license regimes “may prevent the creation of technologies and organizational innovations that would efficiently administer the rights-clearance process”).

193. 17 U.S.C. § 104A (d)(3)(B) (2011)

194. *Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am.*, 659 F.2d 963, at 976 (9th Cir. 1981), *rev’d*. 646 U.S. 417 (1984) (“[W]hen great public injury would result from an injunction, a court could award damages or a continuing royalty. This may very well be an acceptable resolution in this context.”)

195. Cf. Benjamin Petersen, *Injunctive Relief in the Post-eBay World*, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 193 (2008) (surveying patent cases and contending that judicial rate setting is undesirable).

196. See, e.g., *Salinger v. Colting*, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (reading *eBay* to apply to copyright infringement cases; the case involved an unsuccessful fair use defense of the publication of an unauthorized sequel to *The Catcher in the Rye*). For a critical view of *eBay* and its likely impact in copyright cases, see Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, *The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions*, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203 (2012).

negotiations, though it could also considerably reduce the bargaining power of the copyright owner who can no longer wield a credible threat to compel the defendant to cease its activities.

A review of post-*eBay* copyright cases, however, indicates that denial of preliminary or permanent injunctive relief in copyright cases falls far short of general or systematic.¹⁹⁷ With respect to permanent injunctions, only five of twenty-three cases studied through 2013 withheld injunctive relief despite the plaintiff's success on the merits, and, with one exception, none involved a finding of likely future infringement.¹⁹⁸ Regarding preliminary injunctions, in ten cases the court found likely success on the merits and in seven of them it also found irreparable injury and issued the preliminary injunction.¹⁹⁹ Thus, looking to the courts to implement permitted-but-paid by withholding injunctive relief to copyright owners whose substantive claims have succeeded does not seem a likely course.

197. See Jiarui Liu, *Copyright Injunctions After eBay: An Empirical Study*, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 215 (2012) (analyzing cases up to 2010). For a review of post-*eBay* awards (or withholding) of injunctive relief in intellectual property cases generally, through 2013, I thank Trey Brewer, Columbia Law School class of 2014.

198. See Christopher Phelps & Associates, LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532 (4th Cir. 2007) (showing irreparable harm, as well as inadequacy of monetary damages, but balance of hardship and public interest not proven); Brighton Collectibles, Inc. v. Pedre Watch Co., No. 11cv00637 AJB (WVG), 2013 WL 5719071 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2013) (showing no irreparable harm because there was no proof of likely future infringement and inadequate proof of reputational harm); Bean v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. CV 11-08028-PCT-FJM, 2012 WL 1078662 (D. Ariz. Mar. 30, 2012) (showing no irreparable harm in this case because plaintiff (a photographer) could not prove the likelihood of future infringement, because the books that unlawfully contained his photographs were out of print); Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Ltd. P'ship, No. CIV.A. MJG-08-397, 2011 WL 5445947 (D. Md. Nov. 9, 2011) (showing no irreparable harm because the logo which the Ravens unlawfully used had no commercial value other than its use by the Ravens; the judge ordered the two parties to negotiate a licensing agreement in the only post-*eBay* copyright decision so far to have ordered negotiation); Magna-RX, Inc. v. Holley, No. CV05-3545-PHX-EHC, 2008 WL 5068977 (D. Ariz. Nov. 25, 2008) (plaintiff failed to give any evidence regarding irreparable harm, possibly in mistaken belief that irreparable harm was presumed after a finding of infringement).

199. See Bethesda Softworks, L.L.C. v. Interplay Entm't Corp., 452 F. App'x 351 (4th Cir. 2011) (district court was unconvinced by plaintiff's showing of irreparable harm); Frerck v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (photographer gave a limited license to a textbook publisher to publish his photos, but the textbook publisher exceeded the terms of the license; the Court found damages constituted sufficient relief in light of industry practice of retroactive licenses covering uses not originally bargained or paid-for); Grant Heilman Photography, Inc. v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 316 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (very similar to *Frerck*).

B. HOW MUCH CAN ONE ACHIEVE BY PRIVATE ORDERING WITHOUT LEGISLATION? IS COURT-ORDERED “LICENSE IT OR LOSE IT” AN ANSWER?

On the other hand, the prospects may look different if the court makes success on the merits turn on the offer of a license, as did the district court in *Cambridge University Press v. Becker*.²⁰⁰ The impact on the copyright owner’s bargaining position may be less substantial than first appears, at least where the plaintiff was seeking to be paid for the use rather than to prevent it altogether, because a defendant who declines a reasonable license may be subject to an award of substantial statutory damages, as well as injunctive relief.²⁰¹ But the problem of assessing whether the license the plaintiff offered was reasonable may thrust courts back into the rate-making business, to which generalist federal judges may be less well-suited than the specialized Copyright Royalty Board. Alternatively, following the example of the “rate court” jurisdiction vested in the Southern District of New York under the antitrust decree with the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”),²⁰² Congress might designate one particular federal district court (which in turn would name one particular judge) to assess the reasonableness of the proffered license.

C. LEGISLATION TO ENABLE PRIVATE ORDERING?

If full-blown administrative ratemaking is too expensive and takes too long, but license-it-or-lose-it presents the problem of excessive judicial intervention (or, conversely, for those judges disinclined to second-guess proposed licensing fees, excessive deference to copyright owners), perhaps a simplified ratemaking procedure could provide a happy medium. In addition, the procedure should be designed to ensure that authors share equally in the remuneration. I envision a combination of two models, one based on voluntary negotiation of licenses, inspired by a proposed amendment to

200. *Supra* notes 62–64 and accompanying text (analyzing the “license it or lose it” approach of the Georgia State court).

201. Statutory damages are available if the work was registered with the Copyright Office prior to its infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2011). As such, professional publishers tend to systematically register. Of course, no damages, statutory or actual, may be awarded against a state entity, such as Georgia State University; *see Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.*, 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (addressing the Lanham Trademark Act); *Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank*, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (addressing the Patent Act).

202. *See United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers*, No. 41-1395 (WCC), 2001 WL 1589999 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001) (second amended final judgment revising original consent decree of 1941). Denise Cote currently is the SDNY judge who hears challenges to rates proposed by ASCAP.

section 114 of the Copyright Act's provision on compulsory licenses for non-interactive digital transmission of sound recordings,²⁰³ but backed up by Copyright Royalty Board-administered last-best-offer, or "baseball," arbitration. With respect to the latter solution, it is necessary also to consider the institutional setting for the rate determinations as well as the application of baseball arbitration to the copyright context. Finally, any provision for a "backstop" of administrative ratemaking should also contain a "sunset" clause requiring legislative renewal every five years (otherwise the ratemaking authorization expires), in order to promote a transition to market licensing in the event that changing conditions make such licensing feasible.

At the threshold, however, we need to identify the uses to which the proposed regime would apply. Recalling our two categories of fair uses which I have contended should not remain uncompensated—nonprofit public library uses and educational uses—these uses have in effect benefitted from fair use as social subsidy. And there are uses, generally massive in scope, for which market licensing solutions have not yet been devised. Our review of comparative law reveals that remuneration schemes involving voluntary or state-supported licensing mechanisms generally correspond to these broad categories. But a principal difference between the United States and most other countries studied is the prevalence of collective licensing societies outside the United States. Indeed, as the French legislation on mass digitization of books illustrates, implementation of the scheme required the creation of a collecting society dedicated to administering the licenses.²⁰⁴ Apart from the fields of public performance rights in non-dramatic musical compositions, where ASCAP and BMI collectively license users large and small (and operate under antitrust consent decrees²⁰⁵), and, to a lesser extent, reprographic and digital reproduction rights in books licensed by the Copyright Clearance Center, collective management of authors' rights is far less pervasive here in the United States than in most other copyright-producing countries. As a result, unless new collective management societies emerge, or unless the major rightsholders of particular kinds of repertory may combine without antitrust constraints to offer licenses across the

203. Free Market Royalty Act, H.R. 3219, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).

204. *Supra* Subsection III.C. Similarly, the rejected Google Books settlement would have created a "Book Rights Registry" collecting society to grant licenses to digitize out-of-commerce books and to distribute the collected monies to authors and publishers. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 671–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

205. 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(3)(B) (2012).

repertory,²⁰⁶ implementation of voluntary licensing mechanisms is likely to encounter daunting transaction costs. Moreover, where multiple users comprise the class of potential licensees it may also be necessary to consider how the class may be represented in the negotiations.²⁰⁷ State-supported backstops to voluntary licensing can of course relieve the antitrust constraints on rate-setting (as is already the case for certain compulsory licenses²⁰⁸), but those solutions take us out of the realm of private ordering, and into legislation to establish an administrative framework to offer a rate-setting mechanism that is faster, cheaper, and, to the extent possible, closer to market solutions than the current panoply of compulsory licenses affords.

1. H.R. 3219: "Free Market Royalty Act"

In 1995 and again in 1998, Congress amended the copyright act to implement a digital public-performance right in sound recordings. The legislation distinguished interactive from non-interactive digital transmissions, subjecting the latter to compulsory licensing. The regime directed the equal division of the proceeds of the compulsory license among record producers and performers.²⁰⁹ The statutory provisions also permitted copyright owners and webcasters to reach private agreements on license rates;²¹⁰ as a result, many performers may not in fact receive an equal share of the licensing revenues.²¹¹ An amendment proposed in December 2013, the

206. See, e.g., Sound Exchange, a society representing sound recording producers and performers, that collects and distributes the compulsory license royalty for non-interactive webcasting under § 114. SOUND EXCHANGE, <http://www.soundexchange.com/about/> (last visited June 1, 2014).

207. For example, in setting the license fees for public performances of non-dramatic musical compositions by bars and restaurants, ASCAP and BMI negotiate with the restaurateurs' trade association; see, e.g., *Legislative Information & Representation*, MINN. RESTAURANT ASS'N, <http://www.hospitalitymn.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=85> (last visited Apr. 27, 2014) (noting that members of Minnesota Restaurant Association receive BMI music license with discounted rates, though each member must still obtain individual license). In the royalty negotiations for video-programing licenses, small cable operators may designate a Bargaining Agent; see DIRECTV Sports Net Pittsburgh, LLC, 11 F.C.C. 1483 (2011).

208. See *supra* note 188 and accompanying text (describing antitrust exemptions in extant compulsory licensing regimes).

209. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f), (g)(2) (2012); see generally Jane C. Ginsburg, *Copyright Legislation for the "Digital Millennium"*, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137, 169–70 (1999) (describing and analyzing 1995 and 1998 amendments).

210. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(3) (2012).

211. See Kristelia A. García, *Private Copyright Reform*, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2013) ("These private content licensing agreements circumvent both the statutory license and relevant collective rights organization . . . and in so doing . . . potentially alter the rights and entitlements of non-parties in several significant ways[,] including "deny[sing] artist royalty payments to which they are legally entitled."); see also Ben Sisario, *Sirius's Move to*

“free market royalty act,”²¹² would, among other things, replace the current compulsory license regime for non-interactive digital transmissions with

Bypass a Royalty Payment Clearinghouse Causes an Uproar, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2011, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/07/business/media/siriuss-move-to-bypass-royalty-agency-causes-uproar.html> (noting that private agreements “could result in less money and more complications for artists,” largely due to a lack of clarity as to how the author receives payment); Kristin Thomson, *Musicians’ Digital Performance Royalties at Risk*, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION (Oct. 28, 2011, 12:32 PM), <http://futureofmusic.org/blog/2011/10/28/musicians-digital-performance-royalties-risk/> (arguing that direct licenses can hurt performers because they may not receive direct payments, could be paid less, will not be part of negotiations, and could be forced to accept licenses allowing for more expansive use of their music).

212. H.R. 3219, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) provides in relevant part:

(e) EFFICIENCY OF LICENSING.—

(1) COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATION FOR NON- INTERACTIVE SERVICES.—Pursuant to section 106(6), and notwithstanding any other provision of law, any noninteractive services performing sound recordings publicly by means of an audio transmission may collectively negotiate and agree to royalty rates and license terms and conditions for the performance of such sound recordings.

(2) ONE-STOP LICENSING FOR NONINTERACTIVE SERVICES.—

(A) NEGOTIATION OF LICENSES BY COMMON AGENT.—Pursuant to section 106(6), and notwithstanding any other provision of law, for licenses for noninteractive audio transmissions, SoundExchange, Inc., or any successor entity is designated as the sole common agent to negotiate, agree to, pay, and receive payments under this section. If a license for noninteractive audio transmissions is agreed to by such common agent, copyright owners of sound recordings may subsequently negotiate and agree to royalty rates and license terms and conditions with any noninteractive services performing sound recordings publicly by means of an audio transmission for the performance of such sound recordings.

(B) DIRECT PAYMENT AND EQUAL COMPENSATION.—The common agent under sub-paragraph (A) shall make distributions directly to the following recipients from payments collected under this section as follows:

(i) 50 percent shall be paid to the copyright owner.

(ii) 45 percent shall be paid to featured recording artists.

(iii) 5 percent shall be paid to nonfeatured musicians and vocalists (through the American Federation of Musicians and Screen Actors Guild-American Federation of Television and Radio Artists Intellectual Property Rights Distribution Fund, or their successors).

(f) PAYMENTS FROM INDIVIDUAL LICENSES FOR NONINTERACTIVE AUDIO TRANSMISSIONS.—In the case of a license granted by the copyright owner of a sound recording to a noninteractive service performing sound recordings publicly by means of an audio transmission, such service shall pay to the common agent described in subsection (e) receipts from the licensing of such

licenses covering digital transmissions negotiated between a “common agent” representing the copyright owners (currently Sound Exchange) and a collective representative of the webcasters. The negotiations would proceed “notwithstanding any other provision of law,” and therefore would be exempt from antitrust constraints. The amendment preserves section 114’s even division of the proceeds of the license between producers and performers. But, importantly, the amendment makes the performers’ share mandatory by requiring that the webcaster pay the common agent fifty percent of the royalties the webcaster owes under the license, and further instructing that the common agent “shall distribute” those payments to the performers.

The proposed amendment also establishes a compulsory license “backstop for public and non-commercial stations” in the event that royalty rates and license terms “are not negotiated and agreed upon collectively under subsection (e) between the common agent and a non-commercial educational broadcast station” In that case, the Copyright Royalty Board will set rates that are supposed to emulate willing buyer-seller marketplace rates, but one may suppose that the failure of the parties to agree on a license means that the rates are likely to fall short of true market rates. The proposed

transmissions in an amount equal to 50 percent of the total royalties and other compensation that the service is required to pay for such transmissions under the applicable license agreement. Such common agent shall distribute such payments in proportion to the distributions provided in clauses (ii) and (iii) of subsection (e)(2)(B), and such payments shall be the sole payments to which featured and nonfeatured artists are entitled by reason of such transmissions under the license with that service.

(g) BACKSTOP FOR PUBLIC AND NONCOMMERCIAL STATIONS.—

(1) ESTABLISHMENT OF RATES AND TERMS.— If royalty rates and license terms and conditions for the audio transmission or retransmission of a non-subscription broadcast consisting solely of non-commercial educational and cultural radio programs are not negotiated and agreed upon collectively under subsection (e) between the common agent and a noncommercial educational broadcast station funded on or after January 1, 1995, under section 396(k) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 396(k)), a proceeding under chapter 8 of this title shall determine the rates and terms for such transmissions and retransmissions. The Copyright Royalty Judges shall establish such rates and terms that most clearly represent the rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace between a willing buyer and a willing seller. In determining such rates and terms, the Copyright Royalty Judges shall base their decision on economic, competitive, and programming information presented by the parties.

amendment does not specify whether the CRB-designated royalty will be shared equally among producers and performers, but that may be implicit.

The Free Market Royalty Act offers an attractive template for permitted-but-paid licenses. By suspending antitrust constraints, and by encouraging the development of a user-side collective complement to the copyright interests' "common agent," the bill would stimulate bilateral industry-wide agreements, thus reducing transaction costs. Were this approach to be generalized to sectors in which copyright owner-author common agents are less prevalent (or non-existent) it would be necessary to foster the creation of such bargaining entities. The mandatory set-aside for creators is another very appealing feature.

But what if the collective representatives fail to agree? Should the "backstop" measures of the Free Market Royalty Act also be generalized, not only to non-commercial users (i.e., subsidy uses), such as nonprofit libraries and educational institutions, but to all? Is it justified to extend the backstop to commercial users if the basis of their permitted-but-paid license is market failure, given that an amendment inspired by the Free Market Royalty Act would make bargaining easier by allowing the aggregation of owners and users and negotiation through respective representatives? If these devices effectively cure market failures, then a compulsory license backstop would not be warranted. Moreover, were compulsory licensing an option should negotiations fail, actors who believe they have more to gain from a compulsory license regime than from a negotiated license might not bargain in good faith. Finally, a CRB proceeding is currently both expensive and time consuming.²¹³ Accordingly, the current regime might warrant some modifications. The technique of last best-offer arbitration might prove adaptable to the task.

2. Baseball Arbitration: Institutional Constraints

Before addressing how a last-best-offer "backstop" would apply to copyright licenses, it is necessary to confront possible constraints on Congress's power to amend the Copyright Act to compel the parties to submit to binding arbitration.

The Copyright Royalty Board is an arm of the Copyright Office, which is a branch of the Library of Congress. The CRB already is empowered to set rates for the various compulsory licenses set out in the Copyright act; the proposed scheme, albeit what one might call "ratemaking light," seems well within the Board's attributions. Because copyright is federal statutory subject

213. See *supra* notes 187–190 and accompanying text.

matter, and “the claim at issue derives from a federal regulatory scheme,”²¹⁴ copyright claims can reasonably be described as claims involving “public rights” suitable for adjudication by non-Article III tribunals.²¹⁵ With respect to the appointments clause, CRB judges have already been held “inferior officers” terminable at will by their “head of department” (in this case, the Librarian of Congress), and therefore their appointments do not violate separation of powers.²¹⁶

Because the proposed regime relies on binding and compulsory arbitration, the scheme exceeds the bounds imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act. Without an amendment to the Copyright Act to mandate arbitration in relevant cases, the Library of Congress’s power to administer arbitrations would be limited to what the APA allows: all arbitrations would require the consent of both parties, the arbitrators would be agreed upon by both parties, and the parties would have to agree on all issues submitted to the arbitrator.²¹⁷

By contrast, specific statutory provisions can confer the requisite authority. For example the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act allow for the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) and Department of the Interior, respectively, to authorize arbitration upon the request of only one party during negotiations.²¹⁸ The statute does not need to specify the type of arbitration used by the agency;

214. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2613 (2011) (characterizing public rights cases as “cases in which the claim at issue derives from a federal regulatory scheme, or in which resolution of the claim by an expert government agency is deemed essential to a limited regulatory objective within the agency’s authority.”).

215. Cf. Report of the Register of Copyright, Copyright Small Claims, *supra* note 190 (“Because the rights and remedies for copyright are fixed by Congress pursuant to an overarching statutory scheme . . . at least some types of small copyright claims should be amenable to non-Article III resolution.”). The Supreme Court’s decisions in *Thomas v. Union Carbide*, 473 U.S. 568 (1985) and *Stern*, 131 S. Ct. at 2594 suggest that a copyright-licensing dispute would be properly cast as a public-rights case, and that agency-administered arbitration would be appropriate. Indeed, the particular statute in question in *Thomas v. Union Carbide* involved the constitutionality of a Congressional statute that selected binding arbitration (with limited judicial review) as the means for dispute resolution for participants in a federal pesticide registration scheme. *Thomas*, 473 U.S. at 573–75.

216. Intercollegiate Broad. Sys. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684 F.3d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (following *Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB*, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010)) (barring “double for-cause removal”).

217. See 5 U.S.C. § 575(a)(1) (2012) (a decision to arbitrate must be voluntary on the part of all parties to the arbitration); § 575(a)(1)(A), (B) (any party can limit the issues it agrees to submit to arbitration; this could mean that a party may refuse to arbitrate unless the decision is limited to a range of outcomes); § 577(a) (the parties to an arbitration are entitled to participate in selecting an arbitrator; this could result in naming arbitrators who are not CRB judges).

218. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(b) (2012); 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv) (2012).

the agency is at liberty to promulgate rules developing its own procedures for arbitration. For example, FCC rules promulgated pursuant to the Telecommunications Act instruct that “[a]n arbitrator, acting pursuant to the Commission’s authority under section 252(e)(5) of the Act, shall use final offer arbitration,” subject to carefully delineated exceptions.²¹⁹

3. How Baseball Arbitration Could Apply to Permitted-But-Paid

To assess how a baseball-arbitration fallback could apply to a permitted-but-paid regime in copyright law, it may help to look to experience in the Federal Communications Commission. The FCC context admittedly differs from the licenses posited here, because the FCC has employed baseball arbitration as a condition on authorizing the merger of cable operators: when the merger would otherwise result in conferring too much power over video programming, the operator must license the programming to local carriers at a reasonable rate.²²⁰ Baseball arbitration provides the means by which the FCC sets that rate.

If the contexts are by no means identical, they are arguably analogous: the impetus for U.S. courts to find fair use in many of the social-subsidy or market-failure contexts for which licensing mechanisms exist in other countries is to prevent the copyright law from conferring power over content to the unreasonable prejudice of certain public services or technological advances. (Because the essence of copyright—as a property right—is control over the exploitations comprised within the statutory exclusive rights, the author’s or rightsholder’s control over content remains in most cases the

219. 47 C.F.R. § 51.807 (2011). In 2001, the Senate proposed amending title 49 of the United States Code to authorize the Secretary of Transportation to mandate baseball-style arbitration in the case of labor disputes between an air carrier and its employees—the Secretary could forestall a strike by compelling the parties to submit to binding baseball-style arbitration. *See* Airline Labor Dispute Resolution Act of 2001, S. 1327, 107th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm., 2001). This bill ultimately died in committee.

Finally, the timing of the arbitration may carry Seventh Amendment implications. If a copyright holder and would-be licensee fail to agree voluntarily upon a price for a license, but seek administrative dispute resolution in lieu of initiating an infringement action, there would appear to be no constitutional impediment to pursuing an administrative remedy. If, however, arbitration were sought after the filing of an infringement action, the Supreme Court’s decision in *Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.*, 523 U.S. 340 (1997)—holding that litigants in a copyright dispute are entitled to a trial by jury, even when statutory damages (a seemingly “public” right conferred by Congress) are the only damages sought—might entitle either party to resist the administrative procedure on the ground that the court action triggers that party’s right not only to a judicial rather than administrative remedy, but to a jury trial as well.

220. *See* Liberty Media Order, 23 F.C.C. Rcd. at 3346, Appendix B, Condition IV, ¶ 1 (submission to commercial arbitration); § A “Commercial Arbitration Remedy,” ¶¶ 6, 8, 10 (final offer arbitration).

appropriate objective of the copyright system; the prejudice that a mandatory arbitration system offsets must therefore be unreasonable.)

A fundamental principle behind baseball arbitration is to encourage private ordering and incentivize settlement. By requiring the arbitrator to select one of two proposed offers, baseball arbitration urges the parties to avoid extremes by confronting them with the risk that the arbitrator will accept the other party's offer. The academic literature differs on whether baseball-style arbitration does successfully push parties toward more "reasonable" offers, though what empirical data there is seems to suggest that offers do converge.²²¹

In addition, this arbitration mechanism could at least in part avoid the extensive economic and market analysis required in "willing buyer/willing seller" ratemaking in order to determine the proper market rate. "Willing buyer/willing seller" ratemaking, as currently administered by the Copyright Royalty Judges, involves presentation of written and testimonial direct evidence and rebuttal testimony, legal briefing, arguments of counsel, and judicial review.²²² As a result, the most recent ratemaking took over five years from the initial notice-and-comment period until the Judges' final determination.²²³

Admittedly, some final-offer arbitration mechanisms are similarly expensive and time consuming. For example, the FCC proceedings described above often produce large expenses for both parties arbitrating, and though it is supposed to take place over a short period of time (thirty days from notice to arbitration decision, and then thirty days for a decision from the FCC, if a party appeals), parties are allowed to alter the time limits as they see

221. Academic studies of final-offer arbitration in the context of public-sector union negotiations indicate that the procedure does indeed encourage settlement. See Elissa A. Meth, Note, *Final Offer Arbitration: A Model for Dispute Resolution In Domestic and International Disputes*, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 383 (1998). For the original baseball context, see Jonathan M. Conti, *The Effect of Salary Arbitration on Major League Baseball*, 5 SPORTS LAW. J. 221, 232–34 (1998) (suggesting that MLB's arbitration procedure has "achieved its goal" of "getting the parties to either settle their cases prior to arbitration, or at least to submit figures that are within the same ballpark."). Josh Chetwynd notes that while labor relations theorists endorse the view that final-offer arbitration encourages convergence in the parties' proposals, decision scientists often disagree. Josh Chetwynd, *Play Ball? An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration, Its Use in Major League Baseball and Its Potential Applicability to European Football Wage and Transfer Disputes*, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 109, 116 (2009). Chetwynd acknowledges, however, that "empirical data had indicated that convergence was often occurring." *Id.*

222. See Determination of Royalty Rates for Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 79 Fed. Reg. 23,102–03 (Apr. 25, 2014) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. 380).

223. *Id.* at 23,102.

fit.²²⁴ Others, such as the procedure in Major League Baseball, are relatively speedy and efficient.²²⁵

Another issue concerns disparities in bargaining power. Final-offer arbitration appears to diminish parties' inherent bargaining disparity in the baseball context, as well as in the case of public-sector employee unions. In Major League Baseball, one recent study indicated that the players (the labor side) were successful in forty-two percent of arbitration proceedings that went to a final hearing.²²⁶ For public-sector unions, one study examined New Jersey cases and found the party with weaker bargaining power—the unions—won roughly two-thirds of the time.²²⁷ This evidence suggests that parties in a relatively weak bargaining position can nevertheless succeed in baseball-style arbitration simply by avoiding risk and submitting reasonable bids. Moreover, designation of a “common agent” to represent a group of weaker parties may further reduce the bargaining disparities.

V. CONCLUSION

Fair use has gone off the rails with the transformation of “transformative use” from a factor fostering new creativity to one favoring new copyright-dependent business models and socially beneficent reiterative uses. We should cease muddling authorship-grounded fair uses with judge-made exceptions whose impetus derives from distinct considerations. I have, moreover, suggested that those exceptions should not always produce free

224. Comcast Co., 11 F.C.C. 4, 129, App. A (2011) (“The parties may agree to modify any of the time limits set forth [in the arbitration rules] . . . ”).

225. See Jonathan M. Conti, *The Effect of Salary Arbitration on Major League Baseball*, 5 SPORTS LAW. J. 221, 228–29 (1998) (describing the annual two-month window for arbitration proceedings in Major League Baseball).

226. Amy Farmer et. al., *The Causes of Bargaining Failure: Evidence from Major League Baseball*, 47 J.L. & ECON. 543, 562 (2004). However, that author attributes these outcomes to the players being less risk averse than owners in such negotiations, and consequently more often on the losing side; *see id.* at 562–63 (“We find that players tend to exhibit greater aggression than clubs and that ultimately players fare worse when their aggression leads them to arbitration. Our evidence also suggests that players learn, because previously eligible players fare slightly better than do those in first-time negotiations.”).

227. Orley Ashenfelter & David E. Bloom, Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence 16 (1983), (unpublished working paper) (on file with National Bureau of Economic Research). Ashenfelter and Bloom credited this victory rate to more reasonable, risk-averse offers submitted by the New Jersey unions. For a more recent study, see Orley Ashenfelter & Gordon B. Dahl, *Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration* 2 (Princeton L. & Pub. Aff. J., Working Paper No. 04-009, 2003), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=559188> (finding that the “spread” between the two offers decreased from over 2% to less than 1% over a period of roughly twenty years, suggesting that parties do indeed converge on offers over time.)

passes. Instead, I have proposed a middle ground: many of the current social-subsidy fair uses and market-failure fair uses should be permitted-but-paid. This article has recommended implementing that proposal through statutorily facilitated bargaining between agents representing copyright owners and users, backed up by last best-offer arbitration before the Copyright Royalty Board. Whichever method employed to set the rates for permitted-but-paid uses, the copyright law should ensure that authors share in any statutory or privately ordered remuneration scheme. For many authors and other members of the creative communities, while their works stoke the engines of others' enterprises, the Internet age has proffered more rags than riches. Were permitted-but-paid an option, creators might fare better from new distribution uses. Moreover, we would not be lured by a dichotomy falsely pitting authors against a perceived social good: the licensing mechanism would allow both broader dissemination and provide payment to authors. For many distribution uses, permitted-but-paid should replace fair use for free.