Andi Cao, J.D. Class of 2028
In January 2026, multiple reports noted that Apple was in discussions with SpaceX about potentially adding Starlink’s direct-to-cell (DTC) connectivity feature to the iPhone 18 Pro without requiring additional hardware. Direct-to-cell technology allows mobile phones to connect directly to satellites, potentially enabling communication in areas without traditional cellular coverage. As satellite connectivity begins to move from emergency features to everyday communication tools, the question of how Apple could, properly, in the view of the law, integrate satellite connectivity in a way that feels exclusive to the iPhone ecosystem (without actually owning the satellite network) emerges.
Apple’s existing satellite arrangement with Globalstar offers a useful reference point. In a 2024 Form 8-K, Globalstar disclosed that Apple agreed to provide up to $1.1 billion in infrastructure prepayments to fund an expanded satellite network known as the Extended MSS Network. The filing also states that Apple purchased 400,000 Class B units, representing a 20 percent equity interest in the network entity, through a $400 million investment. At the same time, Globalstar retained ownership and operational responsibility for the satellites and licensed spectrum. This structure is interesting because it separates infrastructure ownership from user-facing exclusivity. Apple finances and partially owns the entity that runs the network, but it does not directly hold the satellites or the spectrum licenses. This separation becomes legally significant under 35 U.S.C. § 262, which provides that each joint patent owner may license a patent to third parties without the consent of the other owners, unless there is an agreement stating otherwise. In other words, if Apple and a partner were simply co-owners of satellite patents without contractual limits, one party could potentially license those patents to Apple’s competitors.
The Globalstar filing notes that certain material terms are redacted and treated as confidential. While the exact provisions are not public, it is common in technology contracts to include field-of-use restrictions or negative covenants that limit how and where certain technologies can be licensed (a practice the U.S. Supreme Court upheld in.) From a contract’s perspective, such provisions would function as a private workaround to the default rule in § 262 by preventing licensing in specific markets, such as mobile consumer devices. This allows a company like Apple to preserve practical exclusivity without relying on sole patent ownership. Apple’s 20 percent equity stake also seems relevant beyond financing. Equity ownership can provide governance rights, including access to information or influence over strategic decisions. When contracts cannot anticipate every future risk, equity can serve as an additional layer of alignment between the parties.
If Apple and SpaceX ultimately formalize a direct-to-cell partnership for the iPhone 18 Pro, the legal structure may resemble the Globalstar model. Instead of jointly owning core satellite patents in a way that triggers the default licensing rule under § 262, Apple could rely on carefully drafted service agreements, field restrictions, and defined IP ownership clauses. That approach would let Apple market satellite connectivity as an integrated feature of its ecosystem, while avoiding the regulatory and accounting burdens associated with owning satellites or spectrum rights directly.
From one perspective, what stands out is that the real innovation may actually be the contract design that makes the feature possible. In the end, the technology connects phones to space while the law quietly determines who controls that connection and, importantly, on what terms.